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J O S E P H  B L O C H E R  
Bans 
abstract.  In the universe of legal restrictions subject to judicial review, those characterized 
as fully denying some aspect of a constitutional right—bans—are often subject to per se rules of 
invalidity. Whether the subject of the restriction is a medium of expression, the valuable use of 
property, or a class of weapons, courts in such cases will often short-circuit the standard doctrinal 
machinery and strike down the law, even if it might have survived heightened scrutiny. Identifying 
laws as bans can thus provide an end run around the tiers of scrutiny and other familiar forms of 
means-ends analysis. 
 And yet it is surprisingly difficult to identify what makes a law a ban and why that character-
ization should matter. Why are yard signs an “entire medium of expression” or assault weapons 
an “entire class of ‘arms’”? Why does it matter if they are completely prohibited? If the ban label 
is to have such important constitutional consequences, these questions must be brought to the 
fore. 
 Using the emerging jurisprudence of the Second Amendment as an illustration, this Article 
explores functional, formal, and purposivist answers. It argues that none of these answers can 
avoid judicial discretion in the way that some proponents of rules-based jurisprudence might wish. 
But the ban framework might nonetheless be defensible in a limited set of cases, especially on 
functional grounds, as a shorthand for the conclusion that a challenged law impermissibly inter-
feres with rightsholders’ ability to effectuate their constitutional interests. 
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introduction 
The adjudication of constitutional rights is typically understood to involve 
two steps: a threshold inquiry into the right’s applicability, followed by some 
type of means-end scrutiny.
1
 Such scrutiny comes in many different forms de-
pending on the facts at issue. In the equal-protection context, racial classiﬁca-
tions trigger strict scrutiny,
2
 gender classiﬁcations trigger intermediate scrutiny,
3
 
and nonsuspect classiﬁcations trigger rational-basis review.
4
 Free-speech chal-
lenges implicate different types of review depending on whether the relevant 
regulation involves commercial speech,
5
 content discrimination,
6
 a public fo-
rum,
7
 a nonpublic forum,
8
 a limited public forum,
9
 alleged libel of a public ﬁg-
ure,
10
 and so on. 
 
1. See, e.g., Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1250 
(1995) (distinguishing between First Amendment coverage and protection); Frederick 
Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Sa-
lience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1765-66 (2004) (same). 
2. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (clarifying that racial 
classiﬁcations utilized by all levels of government actors, including federal, are subject to strict 
scrutiny). 
3. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“[C]lassiﬁcations by gender must serve 
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those 
objectives.”). 
4. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 486 (1955) (applying rational 
basis review). 
5. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) 
(describing a four-part test for evaluating restrictions on commercial speech). 
6. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (applying strict scrutiny). 
7. Regulations of speech in such forums are subject to strict scrutiny, and the only acceptable 
restrictions are time, place, and manner restrictions or content-based restrictions that are nar-
rowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 
269-70 (1981). 
8. Regulations on speech in nonpublic forums are acceptable so long as they are “reasonable in 
light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.” Cornelius v. NAACP 
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985). 
9. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7 (1983) (de-
scribing “limited” public forums). 
10. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that the First 
Amendment “prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood 
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual mal-
ice’”). 
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In some instances, however, courts pass right through these ﬁrst two steps 
and apply per se rules of invalidity. The application of such rules can be compli-
cated and subject to exceptions,
11
 but, generally speaking, in these situations 
rights behave as Dworkinian trumps, immune to any kind of overt interest bal-
ancing.
12
 Naturally, this makes it all the more important that the triggering con-
ditions for such rules be carefully demarcated.
13
 Sometimes, the condition is 
constitutionally speciﬁed: the government may not ban jury trials in all criminal 
cases, for example, even if doing so would satisfy strict scrutiny.
14
 Forbidden 
government purpose can also serve as a triggering condition,
15
 as in the case of 
racial animus
16
 and viewpoint discrimination.
17
 
Another trigger, at least for some constitutional rights, is the conclusion that 
a regulation constitutes a total prohibition on some aspect of the right—a ban on 
a constitutionally protected activity or item, for example. The “total” taking of 
property is one such example; a ban on the productive use of property automat-
ically requires just compensation.
18
 Likewise, some courts have held that the Sec-
ond Amendment categorically forbids prohibitions of an “entire class of arms.”
19
 
And the Supreme Court has, by its own account, “voiced particular concern with 
 
11. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1067 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“Like many bright-line rules, the categorical rule established in this case is only ‘categorical’ 
for a page or two in the U.S. Reports” before admitting of an exception.); Dennis v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494, 524 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Absolute rules would inevitably 
lead to absolute exceptions, and such exceptions would eventually corrode the rules.”). 
12. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); Jamal Greene, Foreword: 
Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 96-117 (2018) (describing development of rights-as-
trumps frame in U.S. constitutional law). 
13. See Joseph Blocher, Rights as Trumps of What?, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 120 (2019). 
14. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be 
by Jury.”). I am grateful to Eugene Volokh for the example. 
15. See Greene, supra note 12, at 127-29 (suggesting that the rights-as-trumps frame is appropriate 
where the paradigm cases involve “government bigotry, intolerance, or corruption”). 
16. Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 888 (2012) (“The 
Court has held on numerous occasions that where a law is based on [racial] animus, it will 
not survive even the most deferential level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
In practice, this is not true of all forms of animus, though there are good reasons to think that 
it should be. See Brandon L. Garrett, Unconstitutionally Illegitimate Discrimination, 104 VA. L. 
REV. 1471 (2018). 
17. Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); see also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 
501 U.S. 560, 577 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Where the government 
prohibits conduct precisely because of its communicative attributes, we hold the regulation un-
constitutional.”). 
18. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 (1992). 
19. See infra notes 30-39 and accompanying text. 
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laws that foreclose an entire medium of expression,”
20
 frequently striking down 
such laws without applying scrutiny.
21
 Bans, then, are clearly constitutionally 
impermissible, at least in some cases. But what makes a regulation a ban? What 
makes yard signs in residential neighborhoods “an entire medium of expres-
sion”
22
 or semiautomatic riﬂes a “class of arms”?
23
 And why should a ban be per 
se invalid? 
The question of how to describe a law—whether as a ban, a regulation, or 
merely an incidental burden—surfaces throughout constitutional law. And yet 
the Constitution does not always identify the baseline or denominator against 
which that impact should be measured. If the federal government forbids travel 
from eight named countries that are more than ninety percent Muslim, but that 
together represent less than ten percent of the world’s Muslim population, is that 
restriction a presumptively invalid “Muslim ban”?
24
 If a state law effectively pro-
hibits all economically beneﬁcial use of a piece of property, does that constitute 
a total taking of the lot?
25
 If a law restricts “an entire class of ‘arms,’” does that 
mean it is automatically unconstitutional, regardless of the weight of the gov-
ernment interest in question?
26
 
Although one could illustrate this challenge in virtually any area of constitu-
tional law—free speech and takings provide ready examples
27
—such questions 
are especially pressing today in the Second Amendment context. Ten years after 
the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, the law surround-
ing the right to keep and bear arms is taking shape,
28
 and in some areas it has 
 
20. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994); cf. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010) (characterizing restrictions on corporate campaign spending as “an 
outright ban [on speech from a particular class of speakers], backed by criminal sanctions” en 
route to holding that restriction unconstitutional). 
21. See infra Section I.B. 
22. The law at issue in Ladue restricted the placement of signs in residential neighborhoods. 512 
U.S. at 45, 55. 
23. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
24. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2415-23 (2018) (answering in the negative); infra Section 
II.D. 
25. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
26. Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628-29 (2008) (“Under any of the standards 
of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights, banning [handguns] 
from the home . . . would fail constitutional muster.”).
 
27. See infra Sections I.B, I.C. 
28. See generally Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of 
the Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433 (2018) (reporting results and 
content of more than one thousand post-Heller Second Amendment challenges). 
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incorporated bright-line rules of both validity and invalidity. For instance, in the 
course of striking down D.C.’s handgun regulation,
29
 Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion concluded that the law prohibited “an entire class of ‘arms’ that is over-
whelmingly chosen by American society for [a] lawful purpose”
30
 and was partly 
for that reason unconstitutional.
31
 Some judges have read this to mean that the 
Second Amendment ﬂatly prohibits bans on certain categories of weapons.
32
 
(Then-Judge Kavanaugh, for example, once compared bans on entire classes of 
arms to bans on categories of speech.)
33
 Such a per se rule of invalidity would 
strike down such laws even if they would satisfy strict scrutiny,
34
 presenting the 
inverse of the more common claim that certain weapons are entirely unprotected 
by the Second Amendment and that bans on them are therefore categorically 
valid.
35
 
But which classes of weapons, and why? If a law prohibits semiautomatic 
riﬂes that resemble military weapons,
36
 or semiautomatic weapons with high-
 
29. The law was and is generally referred to as a ban, although, illustrating the central challenge 
of this Article, it actually was not a complete prohibition. D.C. CODE § 7-2502.01(b) (2015) 
(enumerating exceptions for law enforcement officers, dealers, recreational users, and oth-
ers); Heller, 554 U.S. at 575 n.1 (dismissing exceptions as irrelevant to the challenge, which 
involved none of those categories). 
30. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 (emphasis added). 
31. Id. at 628-29. 
32. Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, 
J., dissenting) (“It follows from Heller’s protection of semi-automatic handguns that semi-
automatic riﬂes are also constitutionally protected and that D.C.’s ban on them is unconstitu-
tional.”); see also Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 702-07 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(Batchelder, J., concurring in most of the judgment) (expressing concerns about “judge em-
powering” heightened-scrutiny review of Second Amendment claims); Houston v. City of 
New Orleans, 675 F.3d 441, 448 (5th Cir. 2012) (Elrod, J., dissenting) (embracing an under-
standing of the Second Amendment grounded solely in “text, history, and tradition”), with-
drawn and superseded on reh’g, 682 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2012). 
33. See Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1285 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“A ban on a class of arms is not an 
‘incidental’ regulation. It is equivalent to a ban on a category of speech.”). 
34. See id. at 1271 (contrasting a test based on “text, history, and tradition” with a “balancing test 
such as strict or intermediate scrutiny”). 
35. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An 
Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1475-91 (2009) (describ-
ing “bans on weapon categories”). 
36. See, e.g., N.Y. State Riﬂe & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 260 (2d Cir. 2015) (“New 
York and Connecticut ban only a limited subset of semiautomatic ﬁrearms, which contain one 
or more enumerated military-style features.”). 
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capacity magazines,
37
 is that a ban or a restriction? The answer might depend on 
what one thinks the Second Amendment protects from regulation. “Arms” as a 
whole? The “lineal descendant[s]” of arms protected at the Founding?
38
 Or 
should the question be whether the prohibited arms are necessary (or even just 
especially important) for self-defense, which the Court has said is the “core” and 
“central component” of the right to keep and bear arms?
39
 
The answers to those questions have implications for the shape of constitu-
tional jurisprudence more broadly. Because the characterization of a law as a ban 
tends to trigger a per se rule of invalidity, it is a particularly useful move for those 
who prefer a categorical approach to constitutional law. For many of its support-
ers, the value of such an approach is that it does a better job restraining judicial 
discretion than interest mbalancing, proportionality, and other alternatives, in-
cluding the tiers of scrutiny.
40
 As the Court increasingly seems to favor rules over 
standards,
41
 we might begin to see more cases in which regulations are described 
 
37. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-202a(1)(E)(i)-(ii) (West 2018) (classifying as an “as-
sault weapon” any “semiautomatic, centerﬁre riﬂe that has an ability to accept a detachable 
magazine” with at least one of several enumerated military-style features or any “semiauto-
matic, centerﬁre riﬂe that has a ﬁxed magazine with the ability to accept more than ten 
rounds”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-301(d)(3), (h)(1)(i)-(ii) (West 2018) (classifying 
as an “assault weapon” any not-otherwise-listed “semiautomatic centerﬁre riﬂe that can ac-
cept a detachable magazine” and has any two military-style features, or any not-otherwise-
listed “semiautomatic centerﬁre riﬂe that has a ﬁxed magazine with the capacity to accept 
more than 10 rounds”). 
38. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (describing the “modern 
handgun,” the riﬂe, and the “long-barreled shotgun”). 
39. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599, 630 (2008); see also McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010) (citing Heller for this proposition). 
40. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) 
(advocating for general rules over discretion-conferring standards in the judiciary); Kathleen 
M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 24, 27 (1992) 
(“The Justices of rules are skeptical about reasoned elaboration and suspect that standards 
will enable the Court to translate raw subjective value preferences into law.”); see also Joseph 
Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 375, 381-84 (2009) (discussing debates about rules versus standards and categoricalism 
versus balancing). 
41. See, e.g., ANDREW NOLAN & CAITLAIN DEVEREAUX LEWIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45293, 
JUDGE BRETT M. KAVANAUGH: HIS JURISPRUDENCE AND POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE SUPREME 
COURT 19-21 (2018) (characterizing then-Judge Kavanaugh as having a preference for judicial 
formalism and the idea of the “rule of law as a law of rules”); ANDREW NOLAN ET AL., CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R44778, JUDGE NEIL M. GORSUCH: HIS JURISPRUDENCE AND POTENTIAL IM-
PACT ON THE SUPREME COURT 10-11 (2017) (noting then-Judge Gorsuch’s expressed prefer-
ence for easily administered bright-line rules); Joseph Blocher, Roberts’ Rules: The Assertiveness 
of Rules-Based Jurisprudence, 46 TULSA L. REV. 431 (2011). 
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as bans. It is especially important, then, to know how such characterizations can 
be justiﬁed. 
All laws are bans with regard to that which they prohibit—a driver’s-license 
requirement is a ban on driving without one. But it is hard to see why the label 
should be of any constitutional consequence if it is simply a way of restating that 
a law prohibits something. Indeed, the characterization might often escape no-
tice precisely because it is a predicate to the familiar constitutional tests and 
standards, not a result of them.
42
 There are, of course, constitutional tests de-
signed to evaluate whether a burden on protected conduct goes too far—whether 
it is “undue,” for example.
43
 But in the context of bans, that doctrinal machinery 
never gets up and running. Characterizing something as a ban typically frames 
the challenged law as unconstitutional regardless of whatever scrutiny a court 
might apply. 
This raises the risk that calling a law a ban may simply be an exercise of ju-
dicial power masquerading as restraint. If, for example, the deﬁnition of a class 
of weapons is no more certain than the outcome of an interest-balancing test, 
then invoking the ban framework will simply change—and perhaps obscure—
the judicial power and discretion being exercised. 
This does not mean that the concept of a ban should be banished from our 
constitutional jurisprudence, only that it must be brought to the fore and under-
stood.
44
 This Article identiﬁes and evaluates three possible ways to do so: 
 
42. For an insightful consideration of “constitutional inputs,” see Michael Coenen, Characterizing 
Constitutional Inputs, 67 DUKE L.J. 743, 747 (2018), which argues that the challenge of “input 
characterization . . . arises whenever we must characterize factual information . . . in terms of 
an abstract concept . . . which we then proceed to evaluate by reference to an operative crite-
rion.” Coenen addresses a number of characterization problems in constitutional doctrine, id. 
at 763-86, though not exactly the problem I attempt to address here. 
43. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (“A ﬁnding of an undue 
burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of 
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fe-
tus.”). 
44. Coenen, supra note 42, at 786 (“If characterization choices really inﬂuence the outcomes of 
constitutional cases as frequently as they appear to, then we need to think seriously about 
where those choices come from and how they should be made.”); see also Daryl Levinson, 
Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 1311, 1314 (2002) (“The results of con-
stitutional cases turn on the location, size, and shape of often-invisible transactional frames 
that are positioned prior to any deliberation over the meaning or purposes of constitutional 
rights. This is the basic problem of ‘framing transactions’ in constitutional law.”). 
the yale law journal 129:308  2019 
316 
through functionalism,
45
 formalism,
46
 or purposivism.
47
 Each approach offers a 
different way of identifying which regulations count as bans, and identiﬁes why 
that characterization should matter. 
Under the functional approach, to call a law a ban is simply shorthand for 
concluding that it imposes an impermissibly large burden on rightsholders’ abil-
ity to effectuate their constitutionally guaranteed interests, such as the “core” 
Second Amendment interest of self-defense.
48
 This explains why Heller treated 
as per se invalid a D.C. law prohibiting—banning—handguns, which the Court 
described as “the quintessential self-defense weapon.”
49
 It also explains why 
lower courts have generally declined to apply such per se rules to prohibitions 
on classes of arms—certain semiautomatic riﬂes and high-capacity magazines, 
for example—that are not quintessential self-defense weapons.
50
 
The formalist approach, by contrast, would deﬁne bans based not on their 
instrumental impact, but by reference to some other metric—a more purely his-
torical approach, for example, or a conceptual identiﬁcation of what elements of 
a right are essential and immune to prohibitions. It might be argued, for exam-
ple, that “lineal descendants” of weapons protected at the Founding are immune 
to prohibition, not because of their contemporary utility, but because they are 
the “Arms” speciﬁed by the Second Amendment, and to deny them would be to 
ﬂout the right entirely. Both of these approaches have been tried in class-of-arms 
cases, and the latter in particular may be useful where some conceptually essen-
tial aspect of a right is entirely prohibited, as might be the case for a law that 
totally prohibits the public carrying of arms, thus arguably eviscerating the right 
to “bear” arms.
51
 Nevertheless, in most instances, formalism will end up involv-
ing a fair bit of sub silentio functionalism, which raises concerns that it is not as 
transparent and discretion-restricting as supporters might suppose. 
Finally, in some cases, the ban label can be shorthand for impermissible gov-
ernment purpose. If, for example, a law is signiﬁcantly underbroad with regard 
to its stated purposes—prohibiting one disfavored thing but not other similarly 
 
45. See infra Section II.B (analyzing functional bans). 
46. See infra Section II.C (analyzing formal bans). 
47. See infra Section II.D (analyzing animus bans). 
48. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599, 630 (2008). 
49. Id. at 629. 
50. Heller itself noted that “[f]ew laws in the history of our Nation have come close to the severe 
restriction of the District’s handgun ban.” Id. 
51. Illinois was the only state to have an explicit, statewide ban on public carry; it was struck 
down in Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc denied, 708 F.3d 901 (7th 
Cir. 2013). 
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situated things—then per se invalidity might be justiﬁed, not because of func-
tionalism or formalism, but because the law’s structure demonstrates an imper-
missible government motive. The challenge to President Trump’s executive or-
der limiting entry from certain Muslim-majority countries—commonly known 
as the “Muslim ban” or “travel ban”—is a case in point.
52
 
Each of these three ban frameworks has a role to play, and none will work in 
all contexts. Again, the Second Amendment provides useful illustrations. Func-
tionalism works best when—as is usually the case—the question is whether a 
certain rightsholder has been impermissibly burdened in her ability to effectuate 
a constitutional right. Nearly all Second Amendment cases fall into this category, 
which suggests that courts in those cases should be forthright about the degree 
to which they are evaluating burdens even as part of a nominally bright-line 
analysis. Formalism, by contrast, is most appropriate where the essential sub-
elements of a right—its necessary pieces—are historically or conceptually estab-
lished, and a law threatens to deny one entirely. This is arguably the case, for 
example, for laws that totally prohibit public arms-carrying, which some say 
eviscerates the right to “bear” arms. Purposivism, in turn, is relevant if and when 
government motive matters. If, for example, it could be shown that a particular 
law is motivated by antigun bias, and that the Second Amendment is sensitive 
to such bias, then a law targeting guns more than other instruments or causes of 
violence might be constitutionally suspect. 
Part I of this Article deﬁnes and situates the conceptual and doctrinal chal-
lenges that bans raise. These challenges are deeply intertwined with basic fea-
tures of judicial review, including how to conceptualize the intersection of rights 
and regulations.
53
 First Amendment jurisprudence illustrates that when such in-
tersections are treated as “bans,” per se invalidity often follows.
54
 Takings juris-
prudence provides a few lessons about how to deﬁne bans in the ﬁrst place,
55
 but 
the use of bright-line rules based on poorly deﬁned triggers nonetheless raises 
serious questions about judicial role.
56
 
Part II evaluates three possible answers: functionalism, formalism, and pur-
posivism. Of the three, functionalism is generally the most descriptively accurate 
 
52. See infra notes 334-342 and accompanying text (discussing Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 
(2018) and the framing of the “Muslim ban”). 
53. See infra Section I.A. 
54. See infra Section I.B. 
55. See infra Section I.C. 
56. See infra Section I.D. 
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and normatively desirable. It best accounts for how per se rules have been im-
plemented in the free-speech and takings contexts, and seems especially well 
suited to evaluating most regulations of the right to keep and bear arms. 
The Article concludes by describing how the Court could resolve the pending 
Second Amendment case New York State Riﬂe & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York 
(NYSRPA) using a functionalist approach.
57
 Petitioners have described the case 
as involving a “ban on transporting a licensed, locked, and unloaded handgun to 
a home or shooting range outside city limits.”
58
 The central argument of this 
Article is that the Justices should not uncritically accept that characterization, nor 
the implication that the regulation is therefore per se invalid. Regardless of the 
particular outcome in NYSRPA (there is a good argument that the case should 
be dismissed as moot, since New York has changed the challenged law), consti-
tutional-rights adjudication will continue to face the question of what bans are 
and why they matter.
59
 
i .  triggers for trumps: burdens and the nature of 
judicial review 
When and why rights should behave as trumps is a fundamental question of 
both jurisprudence and doctrine. But the choice is not all-or-nothing with regard 
to constitutional law as a whole, nor even with regard to any particular right. No 
right behaves like a trump all the time; almost all of them do some of the time. 
Within a given right’s doctrinal machinery, some factual situations will lead to 
the application of a bright-line rule, while in other scenarios that same right will 
implicate weighted interest balancing. The question is what triggers the trumps. 
The answer, at least for some rights, is a conclusion that the challenged law con-
stitutes a ban. 
 
57. No. 18-280, 2019 WL 271961 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2019). 
58. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, NYSRPA, 2018 WL 4275878, at *i (No. 18-280); see infra Con-
clusion. 
59. The Court recently denied the respondents’ Suggestion of Mootness, though it indicated that 
the mootness claim would receive further consideration at oral argument on December 2, 
2019. Order Denying Respondent’s Suggestion of Mootness, NYSRPA, (No. 18-280) (Oct. 7, 
2019). 
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A. Rights as Occasional Trumps 
When exercising the power of judicial review in the context of constitutional 
rights, a court must determine at least two things: (A) the reach of the chal-
lenged government action, and (B) the reach of the constitutional right. A chal-
lenge will fail at the threshold if these two do not intersect, a result that courts 
can engineer by steering either away from the other—by narrowly deﬁning the 
constitutional entitlement, for example
60
—or by imposing a saving construction 
on the statute.
61
 Where the government action and the constitutional right do 
not intersect, the law is valid—at least on its face. 
What happens if the threshold is crossed? For rights absolutists in the mold 
of Justice Black,
62
 a ﬁnding that (A) and (B) intersect is the end of the inquiry, 
and the law must be struck down.
63
 On this account, rights are entirely vulnera-
ble to regulation outside of their domains, but entirely immune within them. 
The only task for a judge is, to repurpose Justice Owen Roberts’s famous dictum, 
to lay a statute alongside an article of the Constitution to see if the former 
“squares” with the latter.
64
 
But what does it mean to square? Descriptively speaking, Black’s absolutism 
has not carried the day: many laws burden a constitutional right and yet are con-
stitutional. This means that ﬁnding an intersection between (A) and (B) is only 
the beginning of the analysis; one must next ask whether the regulation imper-
missibly burdens the right. This is evident in the oft-invoked distinction be-
tween “coverage” and “protection.”
65
 Coverage refers to the threshold question 
 
60. See, e.g., James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 
7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). 
61. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(“Considerations of propriety, as well as long-established practice, demand that we refrain 
from passing upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress unless obliged to do so in the 
proper performance of our judicial function, when the question is raised by a party whose 
interests entitle him to raise it.”) (quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919)). 
62. See Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 874-75 (1960) (“[O]ne of the 
primary purposes of the Constitution with its amendments was to withdraw from the Gov-
ernment all power to act in certain areas—whatever the scope of those areas may be.”). 
63. Greene, supra note 12, at 38-56 (providing examples of this characterization in U.S. constitu-
tional-rights law). 
64. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936). Justice Roberts’s account did not age well, see 
George D. Braden, The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57 YALE L.J. 571 (1948), and 
is surely incomplete, but is also not entirely wrong. This Article is in some sense an effort to 
explore in more detail what it means to lay a statute and an article of the Constitution beside 
each other, and to ask if they “square.” 
65. See, e.g., Post, supra note 1, at 1250; Schauer, supra note 1, at 1769. 
the yale law journal 129:308  2019 
320 
of whether a particular person, activity, or thing triggers constitutional analysis 
at all. Some forms of “speech,” to take an easy example, do not implicate the First 
Amendment. With possible exceptions for cases of improper government mo-
tive,
66
 these forms of speech can be banned without any further constitutional 
analysis—they are not covered by the First Amendment. 
But even if a type of speech is covered, that does not mean it cannot be reg-
ulated at all. An activity might still be subject to regulation or even prohibition, 
depending in part on the level of protection it receives—the type of applicable 
scrutiny, for example. If all rights were absolute, coverage and protection would 
be the same, and courts would never resort to the doctrinal tests that have be-
come the bread and butter of constitutional adjudication. Instead, the typical 
case involves two steps: an initial inquiry (sometimes assumed) regarding cov-
erage, followed by a protection analysis that often involves means-end scrutiny. 
This is not to say that Justice Black’s absolutism is entirely absent. One might 
argue that the function of means-end scrutiny is to identify the situations in 
which the constitutional right has been implicated, not solely those in which it 
has been violated. On this view, means-end scrutiny helps identify the bounda-
ries of constitutional rights, rather than evaluating which trespasses are permis-
sible. A law that survives scrutiny is, in effect, one that does not intersect with a 
constitutional entitlement; a law that fails strict scrutiny is one that does. 
This characterization may have a kind of attitudinal appeal, to the degree that 
it preserves an image of rights as pristine and pure, even if not all-encompassing. 
Justice Hugo Black’s free-speech absolutism, for example, was sometimes de-
scribed and defended as expressing a particular orientation toward rights,
67
 even 
though he was not always a free-speech maximalist.
68
 But as a tool for under-
standing doctrine, denying the interaction between regulations and rights is not 
particularly helpful. In practice, courts regularly evaluate laws’ constitutionality 
in terms of the burdens they impose—precisely what Justice Black (and, later, 
Ronald Dworkin)
69
 would forbid. This would not make sense if rights were al-
ways trumps and all burdens were unconstitutional. 
 
66. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 418 (1992) (noting that even “low-value” speech cannot 
be targeted on the basis of viewpoint discrimination). 
67. Charles L. Black, Jr., Mr. Justice Black, the Supreme Court, and Bill of Rights, HARPER’S MAG., 
Feb. 1961, at 63-64 (cited in Greene, supra note 12, at 90). 
68. William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 114 n.15 
(1982) (collecting cases in which Justice Black “vote[d] to sustain many laws believed to be 
unconstitutional . . . even by more conservative colleagues not sharing his ‘absolute’ commit-
ment to the [F]irst [A]mendment”). 
69. DWORKIN, supra note 12, at 192. 
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Moreover, the particular methodology that a court chooses to employ often 
depends largely on how it characterizes the burden on the right: as minor;
70
 
substantial;
71
 signiﬁcant;
72
 incidental;
73
 or, in the case of a “ban,” complete.
74
 
This characterization generally comes after courts identify an intersection be-
tween a law and a constitutional right, but before they apply scrutiny or whatever 
other doctrinal test is found to be appropriate.
75
 
Such analysis, even if guided by doctrine, does not directly evaluate the con-
stitutionality of the government action. It is classiﬁcatory, telling the court to 
apply one test or another. Content discrimination triggers strict scrutiny in First 
Amendment cases, for example.
76
 But what constitutes content discrimination is 
 
70. See, e.g., Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 593 (2005) (holding that a law requiring semiclosed 
primaries imposed only a “minor” burden on First Amendment associational rights and there-
fore did not warrant strict scrutiny). 
71. Volokh, supra note 35, at 1454 (“[R]eligious freedom provisions that secure a substantive right 
to religious exemptions apply only to ‘substantial burden[s]’ on religious practice.” (internal 
citation omitted)). 
72. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 683-84 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding 
that only a law that “serious[ly] burden[s],” “signiﬁcant[ly]” “affect[s],” or “substantial[ly] 
restrain[s]” a group’s ability to express its views should be seen as violating the right of ex-
pressive association). 
73. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990) (limiting the scope of the right by holding 
that neutral laws of general applicability do not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment). Whether and how similar rules apply in the context of the Second Amendment 
is an interesting and largely open question. See Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, What Is 
Gun Control? Direct Burdens, Incidental Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 
83 U. CHI. L. REV. 295, 296 (2016); Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens and the Nature of Judi-
cial Review, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 97 (2016); see also Cody J. Jacobs, The Second Amend-
ment and Private Law, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 945, 946-47 (2017) (exploring how the Second 
Amendment interacts with “private” restrictions on gun ownership). 
74. There are exceptions to this sorting-by-burdens approach, including in equal-protection doc-
trine, where the Court tends to apply scrutiny based on the lines that are drawn (i.e., race-
based or not) rather than the burdens that are imposed. 
75. See generally Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in 
Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867 (1994) (examining analysis of constitutional vi-
olations through the lens of the undue-burden standard from Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 US 833 (1992)). 
76. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015). See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, 
Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987) (describing the Court’s First Amend-
ment jurisprudence). 
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hardly straightforward, and it has been the subject of various attempts at doctri-
nal innovation.
77
 The same is true of the rule that heightened scrutiny in equal 
protection cases is triggered only when a government action has both discrimi-
natory impact and discriminatory intent.
78
 Such classiﬁcatory choices are often 
(albeit not always)
79
 outcome determinative. Likewise, the characterization of a 
law as a ban generally precedes—and, in fact, moots—further evaluation of the 
law’s constitutionality. 
Two important principles are worth emphasizing so far. First, it is not 
enough to say that a law burdens a constitutional right. That is the beginning, 
not the end, of evaluating its constitutionality.
80
 Second, that evaluation will in 
many cases turn on how the burden is characterized. The type and signiﬁcance 
of the burden will often determine what kind of means-end scrutiny a court will 
employ. Most constitutional-rights challenges will be resolved by one of these 
two steps: either they fail at the threshold because no right is burdened, or they 
are resolved at the second step, the stringency of which depends on the nature 
of the burden. 
But sometimes courts sidestep means-end scrutiny and apply a bright-line 
rule of per se invalidity. These are the situations in which a right truly behaves 
as a trump: the triggers and consequences are set out ex ante, and to ﬁnd them 
applicable is to apply them.
81
 Precisely because such rules are outcome determi-
native, it is especially important to understand what brings them into play and 
why. The answers will be speciﬁc to the right in question—free speech has its 
 
77. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227. For commentary, see Enrique Armijo, Reed v. Town of Gilbert: 
Relax, Everybody, 58 B.C. L. REV. 65 (2017); and Genevieve Lakier, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 
Arizona, and the Rise of the Anticlassiﬁcatory First Amendment, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 233. 
78. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 
79. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (2003). 
80. See, e.g., Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 803-04 (1984) 
(“[T]o say the ordinance presents a First Amendment issue is not necessarily to say that it 
constitutes a First Amendment violation. It has been clear since this Court’s earliest decisions 
concerning the freedom of speech that the state may sometimes curtail speech when necessary 
to advance a signiﬁcant and legitimate state interest.” (emphases removed) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (citation omitted)); cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 687 
(2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[H]istorical evidence demonstrates that a self-defense as-
sumption is the beginning, rather than the end, of any constitutional inquiry.”). 
81. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 139 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) 
(1958) (deﬁning a “rule” as “a legal direction which requires for its application nothing more 
than the determination of the happening or non-happening of physical or mental events—
that is, determinations of fact”); supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text. 
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own unique concerns—but there might also be transsubstantive themes that il-
luminate what, in general, triggers the rights-as-trumps frame. 
In his recent Harvard Law Review Foreword, Rights as Trumps?, Jamal Greene 
explores “two competing frames [that] have emerged for adjudicating conﬂicts 
over rights.”
82
 In the ﬁrst, which corresponds with that of rights as trumps, 
“rights are absolute but for the exceptional circumstances in which they may be 
limited.”
83
 In the second, which generally corresponds with proportionality re-
view, “rights are limited but for the exceptional circumstances in which they are 
absolute.”
84
 Greene argues that the ﬁrst frame has been broadly employed by the 
Supreme Court in recent decades, but that it “has special pathologies that ill pre-
pare its practitioners to referee the paradigmatic conﬂicts of a modern, pluralistic 
political order.”
85
 
Greene explains that the rights-as-trumps frame results not only from pref-
erences for rules over standards, but from an understanding of the relevant 
rights regime.
86
 Despite his general skepticism of the framework, Greene notes 
that it might be suitable where the paradigm cases are “pathological” and “courts 
must defend the very existence of individual rights against government bigotry, 
intolerance, or corruption.”
87
 This would presumably include, for example, cases 
where government animus is a serious concern.
88
 By contrast, proportionality 
review is appropriate where the paradigm cases “arise from the potential over-
reach or clumsiness of a government acting in good faith to solve actual social 
problems.”
89
 
Greene’s account is powerful and persuasive. And yet in some cases, courts 
employ the rights-as-trumps frame based not on the government’s apparent big-
otry, intolerance, or corruption, but on the impact of a particular regulation.
90
 
Even cases of “clumsiness” may be subject to invalidation—including through 
per se rules that operate as trumps—when they go too far. This raises a different 
 
82. Greene, supra note 12, at 30. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 96-119 (describing “contingent origins” of the rights-as-trumps frame in U.S. constitu-
tional law). 
87. Id. at 127-28. 
88. In my framework, these cases fall under the purposivist header. See infra Section II.D. 
89. Greene, supra note 12, at 128. 
90. See generally Blocher, supra note 13 (arguing that proponents of rights-as-trumps often at-
tempt to justify this approach in a particular instance by characterizing the burden on the 
right as total). 
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set of questions: not which government motives are impermissible, but which 
burdens amount to bans and why they must be invalidated. 
This Article’s approach shares much with Black and Greene, but also di-
verges both in its approach and its ultimate normative aims. Like Black and 
Greene, the ban framework endorses bright-line absolutism in some constitu-
tional-rights cases. But I would deﬁne that set of cases differently. Rather than 
putting all the emphasis on whether a right intersects with a regulation—an in-
quiry that I think necessary but insufficient—or focusing exclusively on the 
pathological cases—which must be included, but not by themselves
91
—the ban 
framework described here can hopefully accommodate a sensitive consideration 
of both rights and government interests. Per se rules of invalidity are indeed ap-
propriate where, for example, a regulation so burdens the core of a right that it 
cannot be justiﬁed, regardless of the government interest involved. The hard 
question is how to identify those situations. 
The project of this Article is to suggest answers, and Part II does so through 
the lenses of functionalism, formalism, and purposivisim. But ﬁrst, it may be 
helpful to consider in more detail what the consequences are of labeling a law a 
ban, an issue that has received perhaps its most thorough treatment in free-
speech jurisprudence, and when a law’s impact can be described as total, an issue 
of particular interest to takings law. 
B. Bans on Bans: Prohibitions on Mediums of Expression 
Free-speech jurisprudence provides ready examples of the constitutional 
consequences of labeling something a ban. Cases involving restrictions on par-
ticular categories of speech are frequently characterized by disagreement about 
whether the challenged law is a ban. Yet the consequence of affixing the label is 
often clear—per se invalidity—even when the conditions for it are not. As the 
Ninth Circuit has put it, “a total ban of a means of expression” may be “per se 
unconstitutional,” but “the interplay between the Court’s often rigid statements 
about total bans on modes of expression and its traditional ‘time, place, or man-
ner’ test is not entirely clear.”
92
 
That interplay is indeed unclear, though the Court has generally moved from 
a formalist approach (striking down as bans those laws that prohibit a “means 
of expression”) to a more functionalist one (applying the ban label based on how 
severely a law interferes with the overall ability of speakers to communicate). 
 
91. See Blocher, supra note 13, at 123-25. 
92. Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1064 (9th Cir. 2010) (striking down a law 
under intermediate scrutiny and thus avoiding the question of per se invalidity). 
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Whatever its precise mechanism, calling something a ban seems to matter. The 
Supreme Court has struck down laws that, by its own characterization, “com-
pletely banned”
93
 the distribution of pamphlets within a municipality,
94
 hand-
bills on the public streets,
95
 the door-to-door distribution of literature,
96
 and live 
entertainment.
97
 In fact, the Ninth Circuit opinion quoted above concluded that 
Kovacs v. Cooper—upholding a prohibition on the use of sound ampliﬁers that 
emitted “loud and raucous noises” on public streets—is “the only case in which 
the Supreme Court has upheld a total ban on a medium of communication.”
98
 
The accuracy of that description depends on how one deﬁnes “medium of 
communication”—a challenge that the next Section explores in the realm of tak-
ings doctrine. But there can be little doubt that where the Court sees a ban, it is 
more likely to strike the law down. To take one prominent example, in Citizens 
United v. FEC, the majority acknowledged the government interests underlying 
the challenged restriction on corporate campaign spending, but concluded that 
“[a]n outright ban on corporate political speech during the critical preelection 
period [wa]s not a permissible remedy.”
99
 In response, the dissent noted that 
“the majority invokes the specter of a ‘ban’ on nearly every page of its opin-
ion.”
100
 
To what end? Why does it matter if a law is described as a ban? Sometimes, 
the Court has suggested that bans are subject to a kind of super-strict scrutiny, 
in which only perfect tailoring suffices: “A complete ban can be narrowly tai-
lored, but only if each activity within the proscription’s scope is an appropriately 
targeted evil.”
101
 Such a rule makes it particularly important to understand the 
 
93. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994) (characterizing the following cases as such). 
94. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938) (striking down as facially invalid an ordi-
nance that prohibited “the distribution of literature of any kind at any time, at any place, and 
in any manner without a permit from the City Manager”). 
95. Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943). 
96. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145-49 (1943); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 
164-65 (1939). 
97. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75-76 (1981). 
98. Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1067 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Kovacs v. 
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86 (1949)). 
99. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361 (2010). 
100. Id. at 415 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“This characterization is 
highly misleading, and needs to be corrected.”). 
101. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989) (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 
474, 485 (1988)). Justice Brennan, who dissented in Ward but voted to uphold similar bans in 
many other cases, nonetheless provided a somewhat more qualiﬁed statement of the rule—
limiting it to “important” mediums of communication. See Members of the City Council v. 
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relationship between the deﬁnition and treatment of bans. If bans are deﬁned 
narrowly—as only those laws reaching a particularly broad class of protected 
conduct, for example—then super-heightened scrutiny (or, for that matter, per 
se invalidity) seems like a sensible approach.
102
 In other contexts, however, the 
perfect-tailoring requirement seems unnecessarily strong. All laws prohibit what 
they prohibit, after all, and can thus be described as bans, but they cannot all 
raise the same kinds of fundamental concerns. Otherwise, rights really would 
function as absolute trumps and the public interest in regulation would never 
even be taken into consideration. Even the First Amendment’s overbreadth doc-
trine applies only to laws that are substantially overbroad.
103
 
In practice, the application of the complete-ban rule has been more forgiving 
than its phrasing suggests. In Frisby v. Schultz—the same case in which the Court 
claimed that “[a] complete ban can be narrowly tailored, but only if each activity 
within the proscription’s scope is an appropriately targeted evil”
104
—the Court 
upheld a municipal ordinance banning protests outside of residences, reasoning 
that “the ‘evil’ of targeted residential picketing . . . is ‘created by the medium of 
expression itself’” and thus a “complete ban of that particular medium of expres-
sion is narrowly tailored.”
105
 
Similarly, in Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, the Court 
upheld a citywide ordinance banning all signs on public property.
106
 According 
to the majority, “the substantive evil—visual blight—is not merely a possible by-
product of the activity, but is created by the medium of expression itself.”
107
 
Thus, “the application of the ordinance in this case responds precisely to the 
substantive problem which legitimately concerns the City. The ordinance cur-
tails no more speech than is necessary to accomplish its purpose.”
108
 This seems 
 
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 824 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“A total ban on an 
important medium of communication may be upheld only if the government proves that the 
ban (1) furthers a substantial government objective, and (2) constitutes the least speech-re-
strictive means of achieving that objective.”). 
102. Cf. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (noting that in a 
traditional public forum, “the government may not prohibit all communicative activity”). 
103. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 301-02 (2008). 
104. 487 U.S. at 485; see also United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000) 
(“[E]ven where speech is indecent and enters the home, the objective of shielding children 
does not suffice to support a blanket ban if the protection can be accomplished by a less re-
strictive alternative.”). 
105. 487 U.S. at 487-88 (citations omitted). 
106. 466 U.S. at 789. 
107. Id. at 810. 
108. Id. 
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somewhat more deferential than one might expect from the perfect-tailoring rule 
quoted above. What else could have been driving the Court’s analysis? 
Notably, Vincent evaluated the ban functionally, taking the perspective of 
would-be speakers. The Court focused on investigating, as time-place-manner 
cases typically do, the adequacy of the alternatives the law left open: “[T]he ﬁnd-
ings of the District Court indicate that there are ample alternative modes of com-
munication in Los Angeles.”
109
 The impact of the ban on public posters was less 
troubling, then, because “nothing in the ﬁndings indicates that the posting of 
political posters on public property is a uniquely valuable or important mode of 
communication, or that appellees’ ability to communicate effectively is threat-
ened by ever-increasing restrictions on expression.”
110
 Likewise, in Clark v. Com-
munity for Creative Non-Violence, the Court acknowledged that a ban on sleeping 
on the National Mall was indeed a “limitation[] on the manner in which the 
demonstration could be carried out.”
111
 And yet, citing Kovacs and Vincent, it 
concluded that “the ban is safe from invalidation under the First Amendment as 
a reasonable regulation of the manner in which a demonstration may be carried 
out.”
112
 
As explored in more depth below,
113
 this functional approach suggests that 
the underlying question in any case involving an alleged ban is what practical 
impact it has on a rightsholder’s ability to effectuate his or her constitutional 
interests. That was the main theme of City of Ladue v. Gilleo: “Although prohibi-
tions foreclosing entire media may be completely free of content or viewpoint 
discrimination, the danger they pose to the freedom of speech is readily appar-
ent—by eliminating a common means of speaking, such measures can suppress 
too much speech.”
114
 The Court struck down the challenged ordinance, which 
restricted the use of yard signs, because it “completely foreclosed a venerable 
means of communication that is both unique and important.”
115
 
Of course, focusing on mediums that are “unique and important”—for com-
munication, self-defense, or whatever other constitutional interests are at 
stake—raises the question again of what bans are. Any law that has bite in a par-
ticular case is a ban as to that which it prohibits. What about bans on drone 
 
109. Id. at 812. 
110. Id. 
111. 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984). 
112. Id. at 297. 
113. See infra Section II.B (describing the functional approach to deﬁnition and evaluation of 
bans). 
114. 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994). 
115. Id. at 54. 
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videography?
116
 Recording the police?
117
 Robocalls?
118
 Tattooing?
119
 Front yard 
gardens?
120
 Are these bans problematic only if one thinks that the mediums are 
unique and important? 
Again, the Supreme Court’s free-speech jurisprudence provides illustrative 
examples. In Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., the 
Court considered a challenge to a Minnesota State Fair rule requiring organiza-
tions wishing to sell or distribute goods and written material to do so from an 
assigned location on the fairgrounds.
121
 The Court rejected the argument that 
this was “a total ban on protected First Amendment activities in the open areas 
of the fairgrounds.” Because organizations were allowed to solicit funds and dis-
tribute and sell literature from a ﬁxed location within the fairgrounds, the Court 
treated the regulation as a time-place-manner restriction.
122
 
It is hard to read this as anything other than a determination that the law 
permitted adequate alternatives—precisely the kind of analysis that a rule of per 
se invalidity would forbid where a ban is involved. So which part of the analysis 
comes ﬁrst? Characterization of the burden, or choice of a doctrinal test? In Ash-
croft v. ACLU, the Court struck down the Child Online Protection Act, which in 
relevant part made it illegal for any commercial sources to allow minors access 
to “harmful” content (with the latter being deﬁned roughly as that which is con-
stitutionally obscene).
123
 In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy wrote, “[I]t is no 
 
116. Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They Carry, 4 CALIF. L. 
REV. CIR. 57, 69 (2013) (“A wholesale ban of drone videography would thus likely not be 
found constitutional, because it would ban an entire medium of expression.”). 
117. Jacqueline G. Waldman, Note, Prior Restraint and the Police: The First Amendment Right to Dis-
seminate Recordings of Police Behavior, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 311, 345 (arguing against the consti-
tutionality of bans on police recording). 
118. Jason C. Miller, Regulating Robocalls: Are Automated Calls the Sound of, or a Threat to, Democ-
racy?, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 213, 244 (2009) (“An outright ban [on robocalls] 
would frustrate and block such informative uses of robocalls. A statute cannot ‘foreclose an 
entire medium of expression.’” (citation omitted)). 
119. Laura Markey, Repairing the Rusty Needle: Recognizing First Amendment Protection for Tattoos, 
21 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 310, 327 (2012) (arguing that “[a] complete ban on tattooing would 
eliminate the entire medium of expression” and would thus be unconstitutional). 
120. Jaime Bouvier, The Symbolic Garden: An Intersection of the Food Movement and the First Amend-
ment, 65 ME. L. REV. 425, 454 (2013) (arguing that prohibitions on front-yard gardens would 
be constitutional). 
121. 452 U.S. 640 (1981). 
122. Id. at 655 n.16. 
123. 535 U.S. 564 (2002). 
bans 
329 
answer to say that the speaker should ‘take the simple step of utilizing a [differ-
ent] medium,’” citing the “entire medium of expression” passage from Ladue.
124
 
The plurality disputed not the rule, but its applicability: “COPA does not, as 
Justice Kennedy suggests, ‘foreclose an entire medium of expression’ . . . . It only 
requires that such material be placed behind adult identiﬁcation screens.”
125
 
Again, the consequences, and in some sense the constitutional conclusion, 
turned on a characterization of the law’s impact as a ban. 
What seems to be at work here is a version of the levels-of-generality prob-
lem familiar throughout constitutional law,
126
 albeit in a somewhat new guise. 
In most cases, narrowly deﬁning the constitutional interest at issue spells doom 
for the challengers, as in Bowers v. Hardwick, where the Court characterized the 
question as whether the Constitution “confers a fundamental right upon homo-
sexuals to engage in sodomy.”
127
 But although a broad characterization of the 
interest can establish that a case does in fact involve constitutional coverage,
128
 
the opposite is true for a ban. Assuming constitutional coverage, the more nar-
rowly the right can be described—whether a right of homosexuals to engage in 
sodomy, or of law-abiding citizens to possess high-capacity magazines—the 
more likely it is that a particular law will entirely eviscerate that right and thus 
be an impermissible ban. 
The problem is therefore both normative and deﬁnitional. The free-speech 
cases demonstrate that the characterization of a law as a ban can carry serious 
consequences (or at least is often accompanied by them),
129
 but, as we have seen, 
what it means for a law to be a ban is often disputed. In some of the early cases,
130
 
 
124. Id. at 596 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
125. Id. at 583 n.14 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). 
126. See generally Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Deﬁnition of Rights, 
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1990) (arguing that the level-of-generality problem asks “at 
what level of generality should the Court describe the right previously protected and the right 
currently claimed?”). 
127. 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986); see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, 
J.) (arguing that the level of generality should be based on the “most speciﬁc level at which a 
relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identiﬁed”); 
Coenen, supra note 42, at 804 (“A right is more likely to qualify as fundamental when we 
characterize that right as a lofty abstraction rather than a particularized grievance . . . .”). 
128. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the 
right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward . . . . 
[The statutes in Bowers] have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most pri-
vate human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.”). 
129. I hedge a bit here, because—as much of the discussion is meant to show, see, e.g., infra notes 
188-189 and accompanying text—causation is hard to prove. 
130. See supra notes 94-96. 
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the Court treated various mediums of communication (handbills, pamphlets, 
door-to-door distribution of literature) as immune to prohibition without dis-
cussing in any detail the impact that such a prohibition would have on 
rightsholders’ abilities to communicate. The analysis was basically formal; each 
medium was treated as intrinsically valuable. 
But in later cases, the Court evaluated and often struck down such bans using 
a more functional approach. Ladue’s explanation (worth quoting again), makes 
that quite clear: “Although prohibitions foreclosing entire media may be com-
pletely free of content or viewpoint discrimination, the danger they pose to the 
freedom of speech is readily apparent—by eliminating a common means of 
speaking, such measures can suppress too much speech.”
131
 The ﬂexible appli-
cation of the alleged perfect-tailoring requirement in Frisby and Vincent likewise 
suggests that the underlying consideration is, as the Court said in Vincent, 
whether the law blocks a “uniquely valuable or important mode of communica-
tion, or . . . appellees’ ability to communicate effectively is threatened by ever-
increasing restrictions on expression.”
132
 This is a straightforwardly functional 
analysis. 
Neither approach has commanded an explicit or obvious consensus. To re-
turn to the case with which this Section began, this debate was central to Citizens 
United. While Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion “invoke[d] the specter of a 
‘ban’ on nearly every page of its opinion,” Justice Stevens’s dissent argued that 
this “ominous image” was “highly misleading, and needs to be corrected.”
133
 In 
the dissent’s account, the law “functions as a source restriction or a time, place, 
and manner restriction.”
134
 Of course, “[s]uch laws burden political speech, and 
that is always a serious matter, demanding careful scrutiny. But the majority’s 
incessant talk of a ‘ban’ aims at a straw man.”
135
 Justice Stevens argued that the 
challenged restrictions did not impose severe burdens, and that, like those up-
held in prior cases, they “leave open many additional avenues for corporations’ 
political speech.”
136
 
Despite nearly a century of case law involving the ban framework, First 
Amendment doctrine has yet to develop a doctrinal machinery with which to 
evaluate whether Citizens United involved a ban. That is unsettling, considering 
 
131. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994). 
132. Id. at 54 (quoting Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 
(1984)). 
133. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 415 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
134. Id. at 419. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 416. 
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the potentially outcome-determinative nature of the debate. There is, however, 
one area of law in which the Court has consciously and diligently tried to answer 
that question: the law of takings. 
C. Deﬁning Bans: The Denominator Problem in Takings Law 
Ever since Justice Holmes’s observation that “while property may be regu-
lated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a tak-
ing,”
137
 courts have struggled to establish what constitutes “too far.”
138
 Volumes 
have been written on the shape and development of takings law,
139
 including the 
Supreme Court’s efforts to develop doctrinal rules for identifying when a regu-
lation goes too far.
140
 Those efforts illustrate some of the main doctrinal chal-
lenges in identifying what constitutes a ban. To characterize a law as a ban, after 
all, usually means concluding that it fully deprives someone of some component 
of a constitutional entitlement. That, in turn, means identifying which compo-
nents matter—the denominator against which the law’s impact should be meas-
ured. And that turns out to be a very difficult problem even with regard to a 
seemingly concrete legal entitlement like property. 
In the takings context, an “outcome[-]determinative”
141
 question is “how to 
deﬁne the unit of property ‘whose value is to furnish the denominator of the 
fraction,’”
142
 when measuring how much a regulation burdens a property 
owner’s interests. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, a case often regarded as 
having inaugurated regulatory-takings jurisprudence, the Court considered 
whether a regulation that prevented removal of coal-supporting above-ground 
 
137. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
138. Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 
561, 566 (1984) (“Courts apply the ‘test’ [of Mahon] but actually decide cases on the basis of 
undisclosed, ad hoc judgments of the kind and extent of diminution that constitutes tak-
ings.”). 
139. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DO-
MAIN (1985); William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738 
(2013); Christian R. Burset, The Messy History of the Federal Eminent Domain Power: A Response 
to William Baude, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 187 (2013). 
140. See, e.g., Gary Lawson et al., “Oh Lord, Please Don’t Let Me Be Misunderstood!”: Rediscovering 
the Mathews v. Eldridge and Penn Central Frameworks, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3 (2005) 
(noting broad dissatisfaction with takings framework). 
141. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1944 (2017). 
142. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987) (quoting Frank I. 
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Com-
pensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192 (1967)). 
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structures went “too far” and thus constituted a taking.
143
 Justice Holmes said 
yes, because the support estate was “recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate in 
land,”
144
 was severable from the surface estate and was owned by a different 
party. 
In effect, this was the equivalent of deﬁning yard signs as “an entire medium 
of expression”
145
 or handguns as an “entire class of ‘arms’,”
146
 the prohibition of 
which triggers a per se rule. (In the takings context, the rule triggers the require-
ments of public use and just compensation rather than per se invalidity, but the 
challenges are otherwise analogous.) But Holmes’s analysis can also be under-
stood as fundamentally functionalist, rather than formalist—a matter of experi-
ence rather than logic, as it were. He notes that it “is a question of degree—and 
therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions” and that “[o]ne fact for 
consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution” of the 
property’s value.
147
 This attention to the regulation’s actual impact, rather than 
to historical or conceptual formalism, is the hallmark of the functional approach 
described below.
148
 
Much of the Court’s subsequent regulatory-takings jurisprudence can be un-
derstood through a similarly functional lens. Although the “too far” inquiry re-
mains central in takings law, the Court has generally evaluated the impact of 
regulations on the value of the parcel as a whole, rather than on any subpart of 
ownership rights. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,
149
 the 
Supreme Court was again confronted with the question of whether interests in 
a parcel of land (air rights, this time, instead of a support estate) were severable 
for the purposes of a takings claim.
150
 The Court said no: “‘Taking’ jurispru-
dence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to de-
termine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated.”
151
 
The Court held that takings claims should instead be assessed according to “the 
nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.”
152
 In 
 
143. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922). 
144. Id. at 414. Justice Holmes added that it was “a very valuable estate.” Id. 
145. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994). 
146. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008). 
147. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413, 416. 
148. See infra Section II.B. 
149. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
150. Id. at 130. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 130-31 (emphasis added). 
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doing so, courts were to engage in an “essentially ad hoc, factual inquir[y],”
153
 
taking into account the “character of the governmental action”;
154
 the “economic 
impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which 
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations”;
155
 
and the nature of the public purposes or interests involved.
156
 
Penn Central preserved some room for bright-line inquiries, but really only 
at the threshold. The multifactor test, the Court noted, was applicable only after 
an initial inquiry; uses in which individuals cannot have a “reasonable expecta-
tion[]” of a property interest
157
 or those that are incompatible with the public 
welfare simply do not constitute “property” for the purposes of a takings 
claim.
158
 Penn Central thus, in effect, applies the basic two-step coverage-protec-
tion test described above: a bright-line threshold followed by means-end scru-
tiny, the contours of which depend in part on the burden the regulation im-
poses.
159
 
Penn Central’s multifactor balancing test has prompted a great deal of subse-
quent litigation, much of it focused on the development of per se rules to address 
total deprivations of property rights—the equivalent of bans. Just as a medium 
of expression or class of arms must be deﬁned against some background class, 
so too must courts identify the denominator against which to measure the im-
pact of a property regulation.
160
 This was the underlying challenge in the debate 
 
153. Id. at 124. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. See id. at 124-27 (noting that the imposition of restrictions on property use for the protection 
of public health and welfare often will not amount to a taking unless it obliterates the entirety 
of the property’s value). 
157. See id. at 124-25. 
158. See id. at 125-26 (citing cases observing there is no property interest in navigable waters or a 
high-ﬂow rate for tail waters of a dam and invoking the example of zoning laws, which may 
even “prohibit[] the most beneﬁcial use of the property” because they safeguard “the health, 
safety, morals, or general welfare”). 
159. See supra Section I.A. 
160. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 337 
(2002) (declining to treat the right to develop during a particular time period as the denomi-
nator); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717-18 (1987) (effectively treating the right to devise 
property as the denominator); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 
470, 499-502 (1987) (declining to treat the “support estate” as the denominator even though 
it was a distinct property interest under state law); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64 (1979) 
(declining to treat the right to sell property as the denominator). 
the yale law journal 129:308  2019 
334 
about “temporary takings,” whereby a landowner is deprived of all use for a lim-
ited time, and “total takings,” whereby a landowner is deprived of all economi-
cally beneﬁcial use of the land.
161
 
In the temporary takings cases, the denominator problem involves time. Im-
agine that a holder of a one-hundred-year lease is deprived of that property for 
ﬁve years. Is this a ﬁve percent deprivation of the one-hundred-year lease (sub-
ject to Penn Central’s multifactor test)? Or is it a one hundred percent deprivation 
of ﬁve years’ worth of ownership (subject to a bright-line rule)? In First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, the Supreme 
Court held that a church was entitled to compensation when an ordinance tem-
porarily prohibited it from rebuilding a camp for handicapped children in a ﬂood 
plain.
162
 In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the challenge failed at the thresh-
old, since the very use that was prohibited ran counter to the long-recognized 
precept that “all property in this country is held under the implied obligation 
that the owner’s use of it shall not be injurious to the community.”
163
 Moreover, 
Justice Stevens argued that the Court had erred by recognizing the possibility of 
temporary takings claims in the ﬁrst place.
164
 Justice Stevens predicted—as he 
would again in Heller—that the decision would generate a great deal of unpro-
ductive litigation.
165
 
 
161. In practice, these categories are not always easily distinguishable, as temporary takings are 
just total takings where the asserted denominator is a period of time as opposed to a partial 
or use interest in land. Even Lucas was, arguably, a temporary-takings case on its facts. Lucas 
v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1061-62 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“If we assume 
that petitioner is now able to build on the lot, the only injury that he may have suffered is the 
delay caused by the temporary existence of the absolute statutory ban on construction.”). 
  Justice Marshall’s opinion in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. is the other 
leading example. 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) (“We affirm the traditional rule that a permanent 
physical occupation of property is a [per se] taking.”). 
162. 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987). 
163. Id. at 325 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491-92). 
164. Id. at 322. 
165. See id. at 322 (“The Court’s decision today will generate a great deal of litigation. Most of it, I 
believe, will be unproductive. But the mere duty to defend the actions that today’s decision 
will spawn will undoubtedly have a signiﬁcant adverse impact on the land-use regulatory pro-
cess.”); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 680 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (“I do not know whether today’s decision will increase the labor of federal judges to the 
‘breaking point’ envisioned by Justice Cardozo, but it will surely give rise to a far more active 
judicial role in making vitally important national policy decisions than was envisioned at any 
time in the 18th, 19th, or 20th centuries.”); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1061 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“Proper application of the doctrine of judicial restraint would avoid the premature adjudica-
tion of an important constitutional question. Proper respect for our precedents would avoid 
an illogical expansion of the concept of ‘regulatory takings.’”). 
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Fifteen years after its attempt to lay down a bright-line rule in First Evangel-
ical, the Court retreated to a more ﬂexible interest-based analysis in another tem-
porary-takings case: Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency.
166
 The Court explained that “deﬁning the property interest 
taken in terms of the very regulation being challenged is circular. With property 
so divided, every delay would become a total ban; the moratorium and the nor-
mal permit process alike would constitute categorical takings.”
167
 Thus, the 
Court clariﬁed that temporary-takings claims could succeed, but must be as-
sessed using “careful examination and weighing of all the circumstances”
168
 un-
der Penn Central.
169
 
The second notable category of per se takings jurisprudence involves so-
called “total takings,” which are subject to the rule of Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council.
170
 In that case, the owner of two beachfront lots was prohibited 
from building homes on them. He argued, and the South Carolina district court 
held, that this prohibition had rendered his land “valueless.”
171
 Based on that 
suspect factual holding,
172
 Justice Scalia announced a bright-line categorical rule 
subject to historically indicated exceptions, just as he would later do in Heller. 
The per se rule of Lucas requires that compensation be paid “where regula-
tion denies all economically beneﬁcial or productive use of land.”
173
 When, in 
other words, a taking is “total,” compensation will always be required, regardless 
of how the other Penn Central factors might be applied—a per se rule, triggered 
by a total deprivation. Relying on the trial court’s characterization of the 
“coastal-zone construction ban,” Justice Scalia found that the rule applied to Lu-
cas’s own case.
174
 However, as Justice Stevens’s dissent pointed out, Lucas was 
 
166. 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
167. Id. at 331; see also id. (“Petitioners’ ‘conceptual severance’ argument is unavailing because it 
ignores Penn Central’s admonition that in regulatory takings cases we must focus on ‘the par-
cel as a whole.’ We have consistently rejected such an approach to the ‘denominator’ ques-
tion.”). 
168. Id. at 335 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring)). 
169. Id. at 335-36. 
170. 505 U.S. 1003, 1066 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
171. Id. at 1007-10 (majority opinion). 
172. See id. at 1076-77 (Souter, J., dissenting) (labeling the state trial court’s factual conclusions 
“highly questionable” and arguing that the unreviewable nature of that suspect factual ﬁnding 
rendered the case an improper vehicle for clarifying the concept of total, categorically com-
pensable takings). 
173. Id. at 1015. 
174. Id. at 1020-32. 
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arguably best understood as a temporary-takings case.
175
 After all, the harm the 
property owner complained of was simply “the delay caused by the temporary 
existence of the absolute statutory ban on construction.”
176
 As this example sug-
gests, temporary takings are just total takings where the asserted denominator is 
a given period of time. 
More generally, as Justice Blackmun observed in his dissent, the “dispositive 
inquiry” will always “depend on how ‘property’ is deﬁned,” a deﬁnition that 
lacks an “objective” principle.
177
 Justice Scalia in fact acknowledged that even 
“[c]onﬁscatory regulations” need not be considered compensable takings if the 
restrictions they codify “inhere in the title itself,” such as restrictions on public 
nuisance.
178
 In effect, then, common-law exceptions get omitted from the de-
nominator when evaluating whether a restriction constitutes a total taking. And 
as Justice Stevens emphasized, this meant that “the categorical rule established 
in this case is only ‘categorical’ for a page or two in the U.S. Reports. No sooner 
does the Court state that ‘total regulatory takings must be compensated,’ than it 
quickly establishes an exception to that rule.”
179
 
Perhaps more importantly, those exceptions typically involve precisely the 
kind of malleability that a per se rule might be thought to eliminate; ﬁnding 
something a nuisance, after all, depends on factors such as whether a use is 
harmful.
180
 The majority’s opinion thus shifted uncertainty and discretion away 
from the evaluation of the regulation, as in Penn Central, to the characterization 
of the interest itself. In either case, judges would be called upon to determine, 
inter alia, the harmfulness of a use. 
In 2017, the Supreme Court revisited the denominator problem yet again in 
Murr v. Wisconsin.
181
 Property owners had come to own two adjacent parcels of 
 
175. Id. at 1061-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
176. 505 U.S. 1003, 1062 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
177. Id. at 1054 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
178. Id. at 1029 (majority opinion). 
179. Id. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
180. Id. at 1054 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Even more perplexing, however, is the Court’s reliance 
on common-law principles of nuisance in its quest for a value-free takings jurisprudence. In 
determining what is a nuisance at common law, state courts make exactly the decision that the 
Court ﬁnds so troubling when made by the South Carolina General Assembly today: They 
determine whether the use is harmful.”); id. at 1067-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
nuisance has long been a ﬂexible and evolving doctrine but that the Court’s decision threatens 
to arrest it). 
181. 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017). 
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land, but were prohibited from building on the smaller of the two.
182
 The own-
ers argued that this constituted a total taking of the value of the smaller lot. The 
state responded that state property law, which merged the two commonly owned 
parcels into one, should be the only determinant of the denominator.
183
 In Murr, 
the Court formulated a new functional test to determine the denominator, ask-
ing “whether reasonable expectations about property ownership would lead a 
landowner to anticipate that his holdings would be treated as one parcel, or, in-
stead, as separate tracts,” and considered (1) “treatment . . . under state and local 
law;” (2) “physical characteristics;” and (3) “value . . . under the challenged reg-
ulation, with special attention to the effect of burdened land on the value of other 
holdings.”
184
 
What can be gleaned from all of this? From Mahon to Murr, the Court has 
tried for nearly a century to generate doctrinal rules to determine whether a reg-
ulation has gone “too far,” and to characterize the impact of a regulation on prop-
erty entitlements. In large part, this has meant focusing on the property interests 
themselves—the denominator, as it were. Sometimes, the Court has employed 
categorical rules, as in Lucas. But what counts as the denominator—and thus 
what counts as a total deprivation—has typically come back to an all-things-con-
sidered evaluation, as in Murr. In general, then, the Court has embraced the 
functionalist strain in Mahon and rejected the conceptual formalism of deﬁning 
the denominator based entirely on background principles of state law. 
D. Ban-scendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach 
Given the complicated nature of the ban framework, it is worth asking 
whether any effort to ﬂesh out the concept—or at least to give it legal weight—
is doomed to failure. Would it be better to give up on the enterprise, and to ban-
ish the ban framework entirely? 
Right around the time that the Supreme Court was issuing its formalist ban-
on-bans decisions in First Amendment cases,
185
 Felix Cohen published what re-
mains one of the most famous and inﬂuential articles in legal theory, Transcen-
dental Nonsense and the Functional Approach.
186
 Cohen argued, to devastating ef-
fect, that threshold decisions about categorization (where is a corporation 
 
182. Id. at 1939-42. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 1945-46. 
185. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text. 
186. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 
(1935). 
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located?) were in fact effectively decisions on the merits (is this corporation sub-
ject to in personam jurisdiction?) and that the forms of legal argument often 
obscure what is effectively an instrumentalist assessment. He summarized: 
When the vivid ﬁctions and metaphors of traditional jurisprudence are 
thought of as reasons for decisions, rather than poetical or mnemonic 
devices for formulating decisions reached on other grounds, then the au-
thor, as well as the reader, of the opinion or argument, is apt to forget the 
social forces which mold the law and the social ideals by which the law is 
to be judged.
187
 
Would it not be better to engage the “social forces” directly, and give up on doc-
trinal conceptualism? 
One need not be a full-ﬂedged legal realist to recognize the possibility that 
calling something a ban reﬂects a conclusion of invalidity rather than a basis for 
it. A judge, litigant, or scholar who believes a law to be unconstitutional on what-
ever grounds might therefore call it a ban without necessarily believing it to be 
so. The challengers in Trump v. Hawaii,
188
 for example, would not have dropped 
their case if it had been convincingly shown that President Trump’s executive 
orders should not be called “bans.” 
It is entirely possible, in other words, that the ban framework is mostly rhe-
torical. But the same could be said of nearly any legal argument and should not 
be an excuse for ignoring how such arguments work.
189
 Rhetoric can be un-
packed and made transparent, and one can pursue rigor and clarity without be-
coming enchanted by transcendental nonsense.
190
 
Cohen’s message is still fundamental, though. At the very least, the lessons 
of First Amendment and takings law cast doubt on the notion that the ban 
framework will eliminate, or even reduce, the exercise of judicial discretion. Alt-
hough per se invalidity may have a satisfyingly rule-like quality, it is almost in-
evitably triggered by characterizations that themselves involve signiﬁcant judi-
cial discretion. Lucas is a case in point. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion is perhaps 
 
187. Id. at 812. 
188. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
189. James Boyd White, Law As Rhetoric, Rhetoric As Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 684 (1985) (“Let us begin with the idea that the law is a branch of 
rhetoric. Who, you may ask, could ever have thought it was anything else?”). 
190. It should be noted that Cohen himself authored a treatise (on Federal Indian Law), and pre-
sumably saw some value in the doctrinal enterprise. See Philip P. Frickey, Transcending Tran-
scendental Nonsense: Toward a New Realism in Federal Indian Law, 38 CONN. L. REV. 649, 649 
(2006). 
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the Court’s most notable effort to establish a per se takings rule. And yet the 
impact of that effort in Lucas itself was to compound an almost-certainly erro-
neous exercise of judicial power and discretion: the conclusion that denying Lu-
cas the freedom to build seaside homes on his beachfront property had deprived 
him of the only economically beneﬁcial use of that property.
191
 Rather than lim-
iting judicial power, then, the Lucas rule effectively shifted it to a different stage: 
the characterization of the law’s impact—an inquiry that, as Lucas itself shows 
(and as Cohen perceived), can involve signiﬁcant complications. The inevitabil-
ity of judgment came full circle in Murr, as the Court returned to a “reasonable 
expectations” rule for deﬁning the property interest against which a deprivation 
should be measured.
192
 
But even if the ban framework cannot cabin judicial discretion, it might still 
be useful for channeling judicial power toward a particular—and undoubtedly 
limited—set of cases in which per se rules are appropriate. The narrowness of 
that set is evident in the cases. In free-speech cases such as Frisby and Vincent, 
the Court went to great lengths to conclude that no per se rule was needed.
193
 In 
Tahoe-Sierra, the Court explicitly reiterated the limited nature of those rules: 
“Anything less than a ‘complete elimination of value,’ or a ‘total loss,’” the Court 
emphasized, “would require the kind of analysis applied in Penn Central.”
194
 In-
deed, the circumstances under which Lucas’s rule would apply appear so vanish-
ingly rare that they likely did not even occur in Lucas itself. 
This suggests that even if bans appropriately trigger per se rules, what counts 
as a ban should be narrowly deﬁned, whether in the context of takings or, for 
that matter, the right to keep and bear arms.
195
 After all, applying a per se rule of 
invalidity to bans based on a threshold characterization of the law means that the 
 
191. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1076-77 (1992) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
192. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945-46 (2017). 
193. See supra notes 104-110 and accompanying text. 
194. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330 (2002) 
(quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019-20 n.8 (1992)). 
195. See, e.g., Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 666-68 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (striking down 
Washington, D.C.’s good-cause concealed carry licensing standard under a “categorical ap-
proach,” upon ﬁnding that the law was applied in such a way to deny “the typical citizen” the 
freedom to carry a gun); id. at 668 (categorizing its holding as “rest[ing] on a rule so narrow 
that good-reason laws seem almost uniquely designed to defy it: that the law-abiding citizen’s 
right to bear common arms must enable the typical citizen to carry a gun”); Ezell v. City of 
Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that, with the exception of “broadly pro-
hibitory laws restricting the core Second Amendment right,” courts are “left to choose an ap-
propriate standard of review from among the heightened standards of scrutiny the Court ap-
plies to governmental actions alleged to infringe enumerated constitutional rights”). 
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public’s interest in enacting the regulation—what Jamal Greene has recently de-
scribed as “a democratic people’s ﬁrst-order right to govern itself”
196
—will re-
ceive no consideration whatsoever. This goes beyond even strict scrutiny, which 
holds out the possibility that even a total prohibition on some class of activity 
can be justiﬁed if the government’s interest is sufficient and the law is properly 
tailored.
197
 
It is crucial, then, to get the deﬁnition of bans right. Cases like Tahoe-Sierra 
make clear that it is too simplistic to label a law a ban, in a constitutionally con-
sequential sense, based solely on the fact that it prohibits a particular thing. As 
the Court has noted, “To the extent that any portion of property is taken, that 
portion is always taken in its entirety . . . .”
198
 The decision to call a law a ban 
must turn on some broader assessment of the intersection of the regulation and 
the constitutional interest. What, for other rights, is the equivalent of the “parcel 
as a whole”? What is the denominator for evaluating the delays imposed by wait-
ing periods for abortions or gun purchases? 
At least three possibilities present themselves, each of which are outlined 
above
199
 and will be more thoroughly explored in the following Part. First, one 
might take a formalist approach and declare that certain things are simply im-
mune to prohibition, regardless of the public and private interests involved. That 
seems to be the approach the Court took in the early free-speech cases, effectively 
treating certain mediums of expression as intrinsically valuable. 
But in both free-speech and takings law, the Court has generally moved in a 
more functional direction, evaluating bans based on the degree to which they 
interfere with rightsholders’ ability to pursue their constitutionally guaranteed 
interests—expression, for example, or economic development of property. This 
is perhaps most evident in the free-speech cases, where the analysis has moved 
away from an intrinsic protection for mediums of expression and toward a more 
open consideration of the ends those mediums serve and the alternatives that 
challenged prohibitions leave open. 
 
196. Greene, supra note 12, at 128. 
197. See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1673 (2015) (upholding challenged speech 
restriction despite application of strict scrutiny); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 
U.S. 1, 25-39 (2010) (same). 
198. Concrete Pipe & Prod. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 
644 (1993). 
199. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, some of the cases contain elements of a third approach: one that uses 
bans as a proxy for impermissible government purposes. Such purposivist anal-
ysis is central to many First Amendment theories,
200
 and strains of it can be heard 
in Citizens United.
201
 Perhaps more surprisingly, Lucas, too, provides a purpose-
based justiﬁcation for its total-deprivation rule: 
[R]egulations that leave the owner of land without economically beneﬁ-
cial or productive options for its use—typically, as here, by requiring land 
to be left substantially in its natural state—carry with them a heightened 
risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public ser-
vice under the guise of mitigating serious public harm.
202
 
The preceding discussion has attempted to shed some light on constitutional 
burdens and their role in adjudication. That is not a purely conceptual inquiry: 
the exercise of judicial review in any given case could very well turn on whether 
a court understands a law to be a ban. And yet the standard tools of constitu-
tional and statutory analysis do not provide a clear way of characterizing those 
burdens or evaluating why that characterization matters. The following Part at-
tempts to craft such tests. 
i i .  identifying and evaluating bans 
Having explored the relevance of the ban label, the next challenges are to 
articulate potential methods of identifying bans and to explain what makes bans 
constitutionally problematic. Regulation of the right to keep and bear arms is a 
particularly useful and important context in which to do so. 
Although Second Amendment doctrine is beginning to solidify in the lower 
courts,
203
 it remains open to a range of descriptive and normative accounts
204
 
 
200. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996) (“[N]otwithstanding the Court’s pro-
testations in O’Brien, . . . First Amendment law, as developed by the Supreme Court over the 
past several decades, has as its primary, though unstated, object the discovery of improper 
governmental motives.”). 
201. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (arguing that the First Amendment 
is “[p]remised on mistrust of governmental power”); id. at 339 (concluding that the law’s 
“purpose and effect are to silence entities whose voices the Government deems to be suspect”). 
202. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992). 
203. See generally Ruben & Blocher, supra note 28. 
204. Compare David B. Kopel, Data Indicate Second Amendment Underenforcement, 68 DUKE L.J. 
ONLINE 79 (2018) (arguing that empirical evidence shows some courts are underenforcing 
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and is the subject of intense disagreement.
205
 Moreover, it is relatively uncon-
strained by Supreme Court precedent,
206
 and there has been some judicial sup-
port for shaping its doctrine using per se rules rather than standards—or even 
the tiers of scrutiny.
207
 As Chief Justice Roberts put it at oral argument in Heller, 
“none of [the levels of scrutiny] appear in the Constitution;” instead, they “just 
kind of developed over the years as sort of baggage that the First Amendment 
picked up.”
208
 Characterizing a law as a ban is an easy way to leave that baggage 
where it lies. 
After a brief overview of existing Second Amendment doctrine, and a more 
detailed focus on class-of-arms claims as triggers for trumps, this Part investi-
gates the functional, formalist, and purposivist approaches described above. Alt-
hough each of the three may have its place, the functional approach is generally 
the best way to transparently identify and evaluate serious burdens on constitu-
tional rights. It is consistent with the constitutional-rights jurisprudence de-
scribed in Part I and is especially well suited to address Second Amendment 
claims, which are rooted in concerns about the practical ability of gun owners to 
defend themselves. 
Formalism may have a role to play in situations where some conceptually 
essential aspect of a right is being prohibited (the right to “carry” is an arguable 
example), but in most cases the supposedly formalist approach will end up in-
volving functionalism in practice. Even when courts attempt to identify formal 
categories via historical analysis in Second Amendment cases, for example, they 
will almost inevitably have to rely on analogies regarding the effectiveness—that 
is, the functionality—of ﬁrearms. 
 
the right to keep and bear arms), and George A. Mocsary, A Close Reading of an Excellent Dis-
tant Reading of Heller in the Courts, 68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 41, 43 (2018) (noting “evidence of 
judicial deﬁance” (footnote omitted)), with Adam M. Samaha & Roy Germano, Is the Second 
Amendment a Second-Class Right?, 68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 57, 59 (2018) (noting that “plausible 
explanations are available that have nothing to do with judges disliking gun rights, and exist-
ing data cannot rule out those alternatives” (footnote omitted)), and Timothy Zick, The Sec-
ond Amendment as a Fundamental Right, 46 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 621, 621 (2019) (arguing 
against the Second Amendment’s “inferiority complex”). 
205. See Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, The Second Amendment as Positive Law, 13 CHARLES-
TON L. REV. 103, 107 (2018) (describing a “constitutional alternative” to the standard political 
debate about guns). 
206. See Sanford Levinson, Comment on Ruben and Blocher: Too Damn Many Cases, and an Absent 
Supreme Court, 68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 17 (2018). 
207. See generally Blocher, supra note 40 (discussing Heller). 
208. Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 
07-290). 
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Finally, the purposivist approach may be relevant in cases involving consti-
tutional claims—free speech and equal protection, for example—where concerns 
about government animus are paramount. But there are good reasons to doubt 
that the Second Amendment, as interpreted in Heller, has the same animus sen-
sitivity. The Court was clear that the “core” and “central component” of the Sec-
ond Amendment is self-defense,
209
 not combatting antigun bias. And even if an-
tigun bias were constitutionally salient, it is hard to show that gun rights or gun 
owners face the same kind or degree of animus or political-process failure as the 
kinds of claims for which constitutional law has traditionally shown special so-
licitude.
210
 
A. The Second Amendment’s Denominator Problem 
Ten years after the Supreme Court’s landmark opinion in District of Columbia 
v. Heller, Second Amendment doctrine is taking shape. Although the Supreme 
Court has only intervened twice more—once to incorporate the right against the 
states,
211
 the second time in a per curiam decision overturning a case that strayed 
from Heller’s methodology
212
—lower courts have now resolved more than one 
thousand Second Amendment challenges.
213
 The cases do not articulate any sin-
gle rule for evaluating the constitutionality of gun regulations, but that should 
not be surprising. No other constitutional right can be reduced to a single rule, 
and the right to keep and bear arms is intertwined with a particularly complex 
set of historical, doctrinal, structural, and normative considerations.
214
 
That said, all federal courts of appeals to have reached the question have en-
dorsed a two-part test
215
 that employs the standard coverage-protection struc-
ture of a bright-line threshold followed by means-end scrutiny. The ﬁrst part of 
 
209. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630; id. at 599 (emphasis removed). 
210. See, e.g., Zick, supra note 204 (arguing that, if anything, the Second Amendment has been 
enforced even more rigorously after Heller than the freedom of speech was during its ﬁrst 
decade of doctrinal development). 
211. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
212. See Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016) (per curiam) (holding that the lack of 
common use of stun guns at the time of the Second Amendment’s enactment did not preclude 
their protection under Heller). 
213. Ruben & Blocher, supra note 28, at 1507. 
214. For a general overview, see JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A.H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND 
AMENDMENT: RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER (2018). 
215. See, e.g., Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 668 (1st Cir. 2018); United States v. Chovan, 735 
F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013); Nat’l Riﬂe Ass’n of Am. v. ATF, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 
2012); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 
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that test asks whether the challenged regulation reaches arms, people, or activi-
ties covered by the Second Amendment. Just as many forms of speech are not 
“speech” for purposes of the Free Speech Clause,
216
 some gun regulations do not 
come under Second Amendment scrutiny, including (and with possible excep-
tions for narrow as-applied challenges)
217
 those involving felons,
218
 concealed 
carry,
219
 and dangerous and unusual weapons.
220
 When a regulation does impli-
cate the Second Amendment, courts move on to some kind of means-end scru-
tiny, the stringency of which typically depends on how close the law comes to 
the Amendment’s “core” and “central component” of self-defense.
221
 
The two-part test is ﬂexible, widely adopted, and well suited to resolve many 
of the central questions in Second Amendment litigation. But it is not all there 
 
F.3d 684, 703-04 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800-01 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Marzzarella, 
614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010). 
216. See generally Frederick Schauer, Speech and “Speech”—Obscenity and “Obscenity”: An Exercise in 
the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899 (1979). 
217. See, e.g., Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 702-07 (6th Cir. 2016) (Batchel-
der, J., concurring in most of the judgment); Binderup v. Attorney Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 350-53 
(3d Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
218. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (“[N]othing in our opinion should 
be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of ﬁrearms by fel-
ons . . . .”); see also C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 695, 695-96 (2009) (discussing the prohibition on gun ownership for felons 
and its potential interaction with Heller). 
219. Heller, 554 U.S. at 613; see also Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 939 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(en banc) (“We therefore conclude that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms 
does not include, in any degree, the right of a member of the general public to carry concealed 
ﬁrearms in public.”). 
220. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627; see also United States v. Henry, 688 F.3d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 2012) (hold-
ing that machine guns are “dangerous and unusual weapons” not covered by the Second 
Amendment). 
221. See, e.g., Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[A] regulation that imposes a sub-
stantial burden upon the core right of self-defense protected by the Second Amendment must 
have a strong justiﬁcation, whereas a regulation that imposes a less substantial burden should 
be proportionately easier to justify.”); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th 
Cir. 2011) (“As we observe that any law regulating the content of speech is subject to strict 
scrutiny, . . . we assume that any law that would burden the ‘fundamental,’ core right of self-
defense in the home by a law-abiding citizen would be subject to strict scrutiny. But, as we 
move outside the home, ﬁrearm rights have always been more limited, because public safety 
interests often outweigh individual interests in self-defense.” (ﬁrst citing United States v. 
Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); and then citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 626). 
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is to the doctrine. Even when they invoke the two-part test,
222
 courts must an-
swer a host of doctrinal questions: how to deﬁne the boundaries of the right to 
keep and bear arms;
223
 how and how much to invoke history, text and tradi-
tion;
224
 and when and how to defer to the judgments of the political branches.
225
 
In any given case, these doctrinal choices will be shaped in large part by how the 
court characterizes the burden imposed by the challenged regulation. 
In other words, at the protection stage, the signiﬁcance of the burden deter-
mines the stringency of review. It is therefore especially important that one be 
able to account not only for how scrutiny is applied, but for how judges under-
stand the burden that gun regulations impose. In some cases, it is the latter ques-
tion, not the former, that is both disputed and dispositive of the outcome. 
This dynamic is most apparent in cases involving restrictions or prohibitions 
on particular categories of weapons, which some judges see as bans, subject to 
per se rules of invalidity. In resolving these cases, courts often make determina-
tions, explicitly or implicitly, about what constitutes a “class of arms”—perhaps 
the most prominent denominator problem in Second Amendment law. It is well 
recognized that some arms can be prohibited without resort to scrutiny of any 
kind.
226
 What is less recognized, but increasingly important, is the notion that 
some classes of arms cannot be banned regardless of scrutiny. 
As to the former, Heller establishes that some types of weapons fall entirely 
outside the coverage of the Second Amendment. In particular, the Amendment 
covers only those weapons “in common use at the time,”
227
 and not those that 
 
222. Ruben & Blocher, supra note 28, at 1501-02 (noting that the test is explicitly cited in about 
four-ﬁfths of successful Second Amendment challenges in the federal courts of appeals, 
though it is probably applied more often than that). 
223. Id. at 1480-81 (describing litigation regarding prohibitions on gun possession by certain cat-
egories of persons, including felons). 
224. See generally Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment Can 
Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852 (2013) (describing the difficulties of evaluating 
Second Amendment claims in a historical manner while avoiding a balancing approach). 
225. Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 
260 (2008) (“There is no special reason for an aggressive judicial role in protecting against 
gun control, in light of the fact that opponents of such control have considerable political 
power and do not seem to be at a systematic disadvantage in the democratic process.”). 
226. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625 (“[T]he Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typi-
cally possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes . . . .”). 
227. Id. at 624, 627 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)). 
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are “dangerous or unusual”
228
 or “dangerous and unusual.”
229
 (The majority 
opinion uses both formulations, and there is a debate as to which should be fa-
vored). The common-use test as a threshold for constitutional coverage raises 
difficult questions about what classes of weapons can be banned without impli-
cating the Second Amendment.
230
 But so long as a law stays within the bounda-
ries of those classes (if, for example, it prohibits a weapon not in common use), 
it is constitutional; a Second Amendment challenge will fail at step one of the 
two-part test. 
Finding that a regulation does intersect with the right to keep and bear arms 
would typically move one into the second step of the test: means-end scrutiny. 
But some scholars and judges have concluded that certain laws should not be 
subject to such scrutiny—those that, to borrow the language of the takings cases, 
go “too far.” The claim is that, for prohibitions on particular classes of weapons, 
no scrutiny is necessary or appropriate, and the law must be subject to a rule of 
per se invalidity.
231
 
Effectively, this raises the inverse of the threshold question: what categories 
of weapons cannot be banned without categorically violating the Second 
Amendment? Again, Heller provides some guidance but no easy answers. In the 
course of striking down D.C.’s law without the application of any means-end 
scrutiny, the Court concluded that “[t]he handgun ban amounts to a prohibition 
of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society 
for that lawful purpose.”
232
 As a result, when it comes to the lawful purpose of 
self-defense, handguns have no real analogues and no prohibition on them can 
be justiﬁed: 
It is no answer to say, as petitioners do, that it is permissible to ban the 
possession of handguns so long as the possession of other ﬁrearms (i.e., 
long guns) is allowed. It is enough to note, as we have observed, that the 
American people have considered the handgun to be the quintessential 
self-defense weapon. . . . Whatever the reason, handguns are the most 
 
228. Id. at 623. 
229. Id. at 627; see also Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1031 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (concluding that the test is a “conjunctive” one: “A weapon may not be 
banned unless it is both dangerous and unusual”). 
230. See, e.g., Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 135-36 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 469 
(2017) (mem.); Volokh, supra note 35, at 1480-81 (describing “[t]he difficulty with a ‘danger-
ous and unusual weapons’ test”). 
231. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 14 (making a similar argument regarding certain criminal proce-
dure guarantees, such as the right to a jury trial). 
232. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628. 
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popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home, and 
a complete prohibition of their use is invalid.
233
 
This was enough to render D.C.’s law unconstitutional, regardless of how well 
tailored it might have been to serve a government interest. 
What arguably emerges from Heller, then, are three categories of arms—not 
two, as is commonly supposed. “Dangerous and unusual” weapons are categor-
ically excluded from coverage and can be banned without any constitutional is-
sue. Weapons “in common use” are constitutionally covered, so bans involving 
them must be subject to scrutiny. Finally, within the general set of constitution-
ally covered common-use weapons, some classes—including but maybe not lim-
ited to “quintessential self-defense weapon[s]”
234
—cannot be banned, regard-
less of the efficacy of the law or the government interests involved. The last 
category includes the broad class of handguns. Are there other classes of arms 
that are similarly immune from bans? 
This question has most often arisen in the context of bans on “assault weap-
ons”
235
 and large-capacity magazines.
236
 Although such weapons have been used 
 
233. Id. at 629. 
234. As Eric Ruben notes, the link between handguns and self-defense (and even between the Sec-
ond Amendment and self-defense) is not as tight as the Heller majority makes out. See Eric 
Ruben, An Unstable Core: Self-Defense and the Second Amendment, 108 CALIF. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2020) (on ﬁle with author). 
235. There is signiﬁcant debate about the proper name for the class: assault weapons, high pow-
ered riﬂes, or modern sporting riﬂes. See Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 
447 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (rejecting the characterization of 
AR-style weapons as “[a]ssault [w]eapons,” and instead insisting on the term “modern sport-
ing riﬂes”). For present purposes, however, I am less interested in the label than the scope of 
the term. Legally, the deﬁnition varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but most laws are 
drafted speciﬁcally to cover the AR-15 and similarly functioning models from other manufac-
turers, which have been used in many high-proﬁle mass-shooting events. See Tim Dickinson, 
All-American Killer: How the AR-15 Became Mass Shooters’ Weapon of Choice, ROLLING STONE 
(Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/all-american-killer 
-how-the-ar-15-became-mass-shooters-weapon-of-choice-107819 [https://perma.cc/88RU 
-555B] (describing the popularity of AR-15s and similar weapons in mass shootings). 
236. See, e.g., Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 469 (2017) 
(mem.) (upholding a Maryland ban on assault-style semiautomatic riﬂes and large-capacity 
magazines on the grounds that such weapons were most useful in military service under Hel-
ler); Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding a D.C. ban on assault-style semiau-
tomatic riﬂes and magazines holding more than ten rounds under intermediate-scrutiny re-
view). 
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in many high-proﬁle mass shootings,
237
 a ten-year federal ban on assault weap-
ons was allowed to expire in 2004.
238
 Some states have passed laws restricting or 
prohibiting their use or sale, which, in turn, has generated a series of prominent 
Second Amendment challenges.
239
 
Most federal appellate courts have upheld bans on semiautomatic assault 
weapons and associated large-capacity magazines.
240
 Some courts have reached 
this result under the coverage prong of the two-part test, concluding that, for 
example, assault weapons accepting large-capacity magazines are not “arms” 
within the meaning of the Second Amendment and that banning them therefore 
does not raise any constitutional questions.
241
 But most have done so under the 
protection prong of the test, concluding or assuming that the Second Amend-
ment is implicated, but that there is nonetheless an appropriate ﬁt between the 
government’s means and ends in banning the weapons for public-safety pur-
poses.
242
 
 
237. See Bonnie Berkowitz, Denise Lu & Chris Alcantara, The Terrible Numbers that Grow with  
Each Mass Shooting, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics
/2018/national/mass-shootings-in-america [https://perma.cc/V8VG-9E3U] (noting the use 
of assault-style weapons in mass shooting events at Aurora, Illinois; Newtown, Connecticut; 
Parkland, Florida; San Bernardino, California; and Las Vegas, Nevada). 
238. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110105(2), 
108 Stat. 1796, 2000 (repealing 18 U.S.C. § 922(v) ten years after the enactment of the Act); 
see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Effort to Renew Weapons Ban Falters on Hill, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.  
9, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/09/politics/effort-to-renew-weapons-ban 
-falters-on-hill.html [https://perma.cc/4Z2Z-ZM8C] (noting that opposition from the Na-
tional Riﬂe Association scuttled renewal of the statute despite widespread public support). As 
with D.C.’s handgun regulation, the federal law was not a ﬂat ban—among other things, it 
grandfathered existing weapons. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 
§ 110102(a). 
239. See, e.g., Worman v. Healey, 922 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 2019) (rejecting a Second Amendment 
challenge to a Massachusetts law, which was “modeled” on the federal law); N.Y. State Riﬂe 
& Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 248 (2d Cir. 2015) (rejecting a Second Amendment 
challenge to New York and Connecticut laws, which “closely mirrored” the federal law). 
240. See, e.g., NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 260-64 (holding that prohibitions on certain semiautomatic 
assault riﬂes and large-capacity magazines in a magazine are subject to intermediate scrutiny 
and do not violate the Second Amendment); Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1260-64 (same); see also 
Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that the City 
of Chicago’s prohibition on assault weapons and large-capacity magazines did not violate the 
Second Amendment because the features of the prohibited weapons were not common at the 
time of ratiﬁcation). 
241. See, e.g., Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 135-37. 
242. Often this means that the regulation passes muster under intermediate scrutiny. See NYSRPA, 
804 F.3d at 260-64 (upholding assault weapon and large-capacity magazine ban under inter-
mediate scrutiny); Fyock v. Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991, 998-1001 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding 
large-capacity magazine ban under intermediate scrutiny); Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1260-64 
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Some have argued to the contrary that assault weapons not only are not the 
kind of “dangerous and unusual” weapon that can be banned, but in fact are an 
“entire class of arm” that cannot be banned under any level of scrutiny. That was 
a central issue in the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Heller II, which involved a D.C. 
law prohibiting certain semiautomatic riﬂes.
243
 The status and signiﬁcance of 
this prohibition, and its relationship to Heller, was the subject of a lengthy col-
loquy between the majority and then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh in dissent. 
Judge Kavanaugh argued that “[t]he fundamental ﬂaw in the majority opin-
ion is that it cannot persuasively explain why semiautomatic handguns are con-
stitutionally protected (as Heller held) but semiautomatic riﬂes are not.”
244
 
Judge Kavanaugh speciﬁcally rejected any use of the tiers of scrutiny, saying that 
the constitutionality of gun regulations should be evaluated based solely on 
“text, history, and tradition.”
245
 Judge Kavanaugh stressed that this approach 
would not rule out gun regulation, and in fact might permit more of it than 
heightened scrutiny would.
246
 And, indeed, history and tradition do provide am-
ple evidence of gun regulation,
247
 some of it just as (if not more) stringent than 
that which exists today, although it is always hard to draw analogies between 
colonial and contemporary gun regulation. 
For present purposes, the question is not who had the more capacious view 
of the right, nor whether D.C.’s law should have been upheld, but which method 
of evaluation—scrutiny or per se rules—was better justiﬁed. Judge Kavanaugh’s 
approach would seem to rule out any modern regulation lacking an analogue in 
history or tradition—to apply a rule of per se invalidity based on historical, rather 
than functional, analysis. But history itself does not provide strong support for 
this broad, formalist approach to bans and per se invalidity. As Eugene Volokh 
 
(same). Some courts, however, have applied an adequate alternatives analysis. See Wrenn v. 
District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 662-63 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Friedman, 784 F.3d at 410-11. 
243. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244. 
244. Id. at 1289 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
245. Id. at 1271 (“In my view, Heller and McDonald leave little doubt that courts are to assess gun 
bans and regulations based on text, history, and tradition, not by a balancing test such as strict 
or intermediate scrutiny.”); see also Houston v. City of New Orleans, 675 F.3d 441, 448 (5th 
Cir. 2012) (Elrod, J., dissenting) (noting that “Heller and McDonald dictate that the scope of 
the Second Amendment be deﬁned solely by reference to its text, history, and tradition”), 
withdrawn and superseded on reh’g, 682 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2012). 
246. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1274 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, governments appear to have 
more ﬂexibility and power to impose gun regulations under a test based on text, history, and 
tradition than they would under strict scrutiny.”). 
247. See, e.g., SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE OR-
IGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 137-65 (2006). 
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noted soon after Heller was decided, “the mantra that not all regulations are pro-
hibitions has been commonplace in American right-to-bear-arms law for over 
150 years, with only a few departures.”
248
 
Judge Kavanaugh traced his approach to Heller itself: “As to bans on catego-
ries of guns, the Heller Court stated that the government may ban classes of guns 
that have been banned in our ‘historical tradition’—namely, guns that are ‘dan-
gerous and unusual’ and thus are not the ‘sorts of lawful weapons that’ citizens 
typically ‘possess[] at home.’”
249
 There is near-universal agreement on this 
point; it is part one of the two-part test.
250
 But it requires a great deal more work 
to show that only those categories of arms may be prohibited. The possibility 
that some prohibitions (like the handgun ban in Heller) go “too far” and trigger 
per se rules need not mean that all of them do.
251
 This was the essence of the 
majority’s position in Heller II: 
We do not . . . hold possession of semi-automatic handguns is outside 
the protection of the Second Amendment. We simply do not read Heller 
as foreclosing every ban on every possible sub-class of handguns or, for 
that matter, a ban on a sub-class of riﬂes . . . . [T]he Court in Heller held 
the District’s ban on all handguns would fail constitutional muster under 
any standard of scrutiny because the handgun is the “quintessential” self-
defense weapon. The same cannot be said of semi-automatic riﬂes.
252
 
The majority applied intermediate scrutiny and upheld the restriction.
253
 
 
248. Volokh, supra note 35, at 1461 (footnote omitted); see id. (“The judges who are most likely to 
take at least a moderately broad view of the right—judging by Heller, usually the more con-
servative judges—are also the judges who are most likely to take such traditions seriously.”). 
249. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1271-72 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
250. See, e.g., Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 130 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 469 
(2017) (mem.) (“We conclude . . . that the banned assault weapons and large-capacity maga-
zines are not constitutionally protected arms.”); N.Y. State Riﬂe & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 
F.3d 242, 255-57 (2d Cir. 2015) (concluding that prohibited weapons were in common use, and 
thus proceeding to step two). 
251. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 35, at 1447 (“[E]ven if some kinds of gun bans are presumptively 
unconstitutional, under something like strict scrutiny or a rule of per se invalidity, it doesn’t 
follow that less burdensome restrictions must be judged under the same test.”). 
252. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1268-69 (citations omitted). 
253. Id. at 1261-62. Judge Kavanaugh objected to this as well: “Even if it were appropriate to apply 
some kind of balancing test or level of scrutiny to D.C.’s ban on semiautomatic riﬂes, the 
proper test would be strict scrutiny, as explained above. That is particularly true where, as 
here, a court is analyzing a ban on a class of arms within the scope of Second Amendment 
protection.” Id. at 1288 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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It is important to emphasize that Judge Kavanaugh’s approach would not 
rule out all bans on classes of arms. He would have preserved the exception for 
“dangerous and unusual” weapons not in common use, for example. The simi-
larity to Lucas is impossible to miss: a seemingly bright-line rule, subject to his-
torically indicated exceptions (harmful uses of property; “dangerous and unu-
sual” weapons) whose deﬁnition involves signiﬁcant judicial discretion.
254
 
The divisions in Heller II were deep with regard to interpretive methodology 
and doctrinal design. But for present purposes, what matters most is that the 
judges also disagreed about how to characterize the challenged regulation—
whether to think of it as a ban on a “class of arms,”
255
 or merely “on a sub-class 
of riﬂes,”
256
 and whether either characterization should trigger per se invalida-
tion. The answers to that disagreement are not readily to be found in the debates 
about originalism and nonoriginalism. They depend on how one understands 
the burden imposed by a particular restriction. 
To make sense of the cases, then, let alone to predict the path of doctrine, it 
is important to understand what makes a gun regulation a ban, subject to per se 
invalidity. In takings, courts “compare the value that has been taken from the 
property with the value that remains in the property.”
257
 What is the equivalent 
in Second Amendment cases? How does one know which gun laws are “total” 
deprivations? And why should that matter? The following Sections consider 
these questions through the lenses of functionalism, formalism, and purposiv-
ism. 
B. Functionalism 
As explained above, one way to evaluate the constitutionality of a law is by 
considering how it functionally burdens a rightsholder’s pursuit of a constitu-
tionally protected interest. Which interests count in this calculus will vary de-
pending on the right. Free speech, for example, is typically conceptualized as 
necessary (or even just very important) to furthering ends such as democracy, 
 
254. See id. at 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing that, under Heller, “judges [may not] re-
calibrate the scope of the Second Amendment right based on judicial assessment of whether 
the law advances a sufficiently compelling or important government interest to override the 
individual right”). 
255. Id. at 1288. 
256. Id. at 1268 (majority opinion). 
257. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987). 
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truth, and personal autonomy.
258
 From a functional perspective, restrictions on 
speech are suspect because, and to the extent that, they interfere with the pursuit 
of those ends. If democracy is the lodestar of free speech, then political speech is 
of particular importance, and the majority’s insistence on the ban label in Citizens 
United is easier to explain.
259
 Prohibitions on nonrepresentational art or instru-
mental music, by contrast, would be harder to describe as bans in a constitution-
ally relevant sense, since it is harder to argue that they are essential to democ-
racy.
260
 
Second Amendment theory is not yet as well developed as that of the First, 
but it, too, is often described in functional terms, with courts casting the right to 
keep and bear arms as necessary to preserve personal safety, prevent tyranny, or 
guarantee individual autonomy.
261
 Gun regulations might similarly be evaluated 
based on how much they interfere with those ends. Restrictions on arms that are 
crucial for self-defense purposes, for example, would be subject to particularly 
heightened scrutiny. Weapons useless for self-defense would receive less protec-
tion, or might lack coverage entirely. On the antityranny view, by contrast, the 
relevant question would be whether the prohibited classes of weapons would be 
useful in deterring or resisting an oppressive government. 
From the functional perspective, to call a law a ban (subject to per se inva-
lidity) is just to say that it impairs the pursuit of a constitutional interest by de-
priving people of a particularly important means of doing so. As Volokh puts it,  
[T]he ‘entire medium’ and ‘entire class’ formulations should be seen as 
shorthand proxies for an inquiry into the functional magnitude of the 
restriction: whether the measures ‘signiﬁcantly impair the ability of in-
dividuals to communicate their views to others,’ or whether they signif-
icantly impair the ability of people to protect themselves.
262
  
 
258. Alexander Tsesis, Balancing Free Speech, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6-16 (2016) (identifying “the most 
inﬂuential schools of free speech theory” as the acquisition of truth, political speech, and self-
expression). 
259. See supra notes 99-100, 133-135 and accompanying text. 
260. The connection can still be made, of course, or at least explored, and such mediums might 
still be protected on other First Amendment grounds. See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET ET AL., FREE 
SPEECH BEYOND WORDS: THE SURPRISING REACH OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 31-36, 99-100 
(2017). 
261. For a lengthier discussion of these three Second Amendment theories—which, it should be 
noted, echo the three major classes of free-speech theories—see BLOCHER & MILLER, supra 
note 214, at 148-72. 
262. Volokh, supra note 35, at 1458 (footnote omitted). 
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Particular categories of activities or objects have no intrinsic value that would 
make their prohibition problematic; the practical impact on the rightsholder is 
paramount. The reason that the Court might have “particular concern with laws 
that foreclose an entire medium of expression,”
263
 for example, is that certain 
mediums of expression play a uniquely important role for speakers, and such 
laws therefore deny critical avenues of self-expression. 
One obvious question for this approach is how to deﬁne the “functional 
magnitude” (to use Volokh’s phrase) that makes a restriction a ban.
264
 If the tar-
get of a restriction is unique and essential to achieving the constitutional interest 
itself, a law prohibiting it is effectively a prohibition on the right itself. Heller 
suggested as much of handguns and the “core” Second Amendment interest of 
self-defense; presumably the same could be said of “quintessential” mediums of 
First Amendment activity such as newspapers.
265
 Other classes of arms or ex-
pression might be less closely related, however—chemical weapons, perhaps, or 
sound trucks.
266
 If those classes of arms or mediums of expression are forbidden, 
the impact on rightsholders is not of a kind that would trigger per se invalidity. 
As the example suggests, one natural implication of this view is that to call a 
regulation a functional ban, one must look not only at what it prohibits but what 
it permits.
267
 If the regulation leaves open adequate alternative avenues for fur-
thering the constitutional interest underlying the right—whether it be self-ex-
pression or self-defense—then the burden it imposes should not be characterized 
as a ban. The law might still be troublesome, and might even be unconstitu-
tional, but should be evaluated according to standard doctrinal machinery, rather 
than a per se rule. To do otherwise is to foreclose any consideration whatsoever 
of the public interest underlying the regulation. 
The Second Amendment appears to lend itself well to this kind of functional 
analysis in most cases. Consider “class of arms” claims. Even under a broad un-
derstanding of the right to keep and bear arms, it is hard to see how weapons 
have intrinsic value. They are constitutionally signiﬁcant precisely because of 
their function, whether that is self-defense against criminals or deterrence of a 
tyrannical government. That is why Dick Heller characterized D.C.’s safe storage 
 
263. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994). 
264. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 812 (2000) (“The distinction between 
laws burdening and laws banning [constitutionally protected activity] is but a matter of de-
gree.”). 
265. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (noting that in a 
traditional public forum, “the government may not prohibit all communicative activity”). 
266. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87-89 (1949). 
267. This is essentially the Trump v. Hawaii debate. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); see infra notes 334-342 
and accompanying text. 
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requirement as a prohibition on “functional ﬁrearms within the home.”
268
 This 
does not make the right to keep and bear arms any less than fundamental, how-
ever; many constitutional rights are prophylactic or instrumental.
269
 The point 
is simply that burdens on such rights, including the evaluation of bans, should 
be understood and characterized in light of how they impact people’s ability to 
pursue their constitutional interests. 
In Second Amendment cases, this would mean evaluating the importance of 
a particular class of arms to the core interest identiﬁed in Heller: self-defense.
270
 
A class of weapons that is essential to vindicating that right might be subject to 
a per se rule of protection. Heller seems to make this point in concluding that 
“handguns are the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense 
in the home, and a complete prohibition of their use is invalid.”
271
 Some courts, 
including the D.C. Circuit in Heller II, have read this sentence as holding that 
“the District’s ban on all handguns would fail constitutional muster under any 
standard of scrutiny because the handgun is the ‘quintessential’ self-defense 
weapon.”
272
 
Again, one can see an analogy to takings: a total deprivation of self-defense 
(the Second Amendment’s core value) triggers per se invalidity, just as complete 
deprivation of economically beneﬁcial use (a core value of property ownership) 
triggers the Fifth Amendment’s compensation requirement. In both contexts, 
application of the rule requires consideration of what alternatives are left open 
by the challenged law. This was precisely the debate in Lucas: the Supreme 
Court’s decision rested on the questionable lower court determination that 
South Carolina’s prohibition on house building actually was a total denial of all 
 
268. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008). 
269. For some discussion of the difference between instrumental and intrinsic rights, and the ways 
in which constitutional law sometimes treats them differently, see Joseph Blocher, Rights to 
and Not to, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 761, 802-14 (2012). 
270. I assume for these purposes that self-defense—or personal safety more broadly—is indeed the 
central value of the Second Amendment; one could of course do the same exercise with some 
other value, like the prevention of tyranny. 
271. Heller, 554 U.S. 629. One sees the same basic theme in Heller’s dramatic closing lines: “[W]hat 
is not debatable is that it is not the role of this Court to pronounce the Second Amendment 
extinct.” Id. at 636. 
272. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (emphasis added) (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 
629). 
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economically beneﬁcial uses.
273
 The equivalent conclusion in a Second Amend-
ment case would be that a prohibition on a class of weapons did not permit “law-
abiding citizens [to] retain adequate means of self-defense.”
274
 
Such adequate alternatives analysis appears elsewhere in constitutional law, 
including in First Amendment doctrine. The Supreme Court has long treated 
time, place, and manner restrictions as constitutional if “they are justiﬁed with-
out reference to the content of the regulated speech, . . . serve a signiﬁcant gov-
ernmental interest, and . . . leave open ample alternative channels for communi-
cation of the information.”
275
 For example, in Kovacs v. Cooper, the Court upheld 
a prohibition on the use of mobile loudspeakers in public streets in part because 
various other media like “voice,” “pamphlets,” and “newspapers” were adequate 
to communicate the message.
276
 Similarly, in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court up-
held the Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003 in part because it proscribed only a 
particular abortion procedure while preserving others.
277
 
Of course, to say that one thing is an adequate alternative for another is not 
the same as saying that it is a perfect substitute,
278
 and current doctrines do not 
necessarily provide clear guidance on how similar a substitute must be to consti-
tute an “adequate” alternative. Even without such guidance, it will sometimes be 
easy enough to conclude that a particular restriction has no apparent impact at 
all on the underlying constitutional interest, whether that be political expression, 
abortion, or self-defense. Functionally speaking, such a law would not be a con-
stitutionally suspect “ban.” But to repurpose an example from Volokh, assume 
that guns of a certain popular color are entirely prohibited, while alternative col-
ors are available. Although this would constitute a ban on an identiﬁable class of 
weapons in common use, it would likely be constitutional for the simple reason 
that it would have no functional impact on the interests underlying the right to 
 
273. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); see supra notes 171-172 and accompanying 
text. 
274. Cf. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 411 (7th Cir. 2015) (ﬁnding that a ban 
on a class of riﬂes did preserve such alternatives). 
275. Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981) (quoting Va. Phar-
macy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)). For a thoughtful cri-
tique of this approach, see Enrique Armijo, The “Ample Alternative Channels” Flaw in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1657 (2016). 
276. 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (plurality decision). 
277. 550 U.S. 124, 134, 156-58 (2007). 
278. Cf. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 88-89 (“That more people may be more easily and cheaply reached by 
sound trucks . . . , is not enough to call forth constitutional protection for what those charged 
with public welfare reasonably think is a nuisance when easy means of publicity are open.”). 
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keep and bear arms; guns of other colors could be used for self-defense.
279
 The 
same should be true of a prohibition on guns with obliterated serial numbers, 
and for the same reason: prohibiting those guns does not meaningfully burden 
people’s ability to defend themselves with arms,
280
 because a gun with serial 
numbers serves that function just as well as one without. 
But those are easy examples. What if later developments in self-defense tech-
nology generate perfect nonlethal substitutes for ﬁrearms? Would that change 
the constitutional calculus with regard to laws that are today subject to per se 
invalidity, like handgun bans?
281
 Or, to ask the question another way, how sig-
niﬁcant must a burden be before it is subject to per se invalidity? The fact that a 
law represents a ban from the perspective of a restricted individual cannot trigger 
a per se rule of invalidity, or else all legal restrictions—not just gun laws—would 
be invalid. An as-applied challenge might be appropriate in some circum-
stances,
282
 but the availability of that route does not much depend on the ban 
characterization. 
That is not to say that no regulation could ever constitute a functional ban, 
only that rules of per se invalidity should be reserved for those cases in which 
regulations deny essential or near-essential means of achieving the interests 
guaranteed by the right. In the Second Amendment context, the functionalist 
question should be whether a law denies people the ability to effectuate the 
“core” interest of self-defense with arms. Burdens that fall short of that should 
be subject to means-end scrutiny, which might be ratcheted up if the burden is 
signiﬁcant or impacts the “core” of the right. The point here is simply that a 
prohibition on any particular class of arms should not be subject to per se inva-
lidity if alternative means of armed self-defense are available. The mere fact that 
a law is not a ban, however, does not mean the regulation is constitutional. 
By way of illustration, consider Heller’s emphasis on the uniqueness of hand-
guns as a self-defense weapon. Although that conclusion may justify the Court’s 
 
279. I should note that the “would likely be constitutional” conclusion is my own; Volokh’s point 
is simply that the ban characterization should not count one way or the other. See Volokh, 
supra note 35, at 1457-58 (“The constitutionality of this law should not be much affected by 
the historical or esthetic circumstance of whether black and silver handguns, or mechanical 
handguns, are the most popular form of weapon, or are seen as a separate ‘class of “arms.”’”). 
280. See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 94 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Because the presence of 
a serial number does not impair the use or functioning of a weapon in any way, the burden on 
Marzzarella’s ability to defend himself is arguably de minimis.”). 
281. This argument is described in somewhat more detail in Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, 
Lethality, Public Carry, and Adequate Alternatives, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 279 (2016). 
282. See, e.g., Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 702-07 (6th Cir. 2016) (Batchel-
der, J., concurring in most of the judgment); Binderup v. Attorney Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 350-53 
(3d Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
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per se invalidation of D.C.’s handgun prohibition, it makes it harder to justify 
the use of similar per se rules with regard to other classes of weapons, including 
high-powered riﬂes. Indeed, some of Heller’s amici emphasized that long guns 
are inadequate for self-defense,
283
 and—as discussed more below
284
—the Court 
said “it was no answer” that long guns (including high-powered riﬂes) were 
available under the D.C. law.
285
 It follows logically that such riﬂes are not the 
kind of “quintessential” self-defense weapon that must be protected by a bright-
line rule.
286
 
Along the same lines, some of the debates regarding assault-weapons bans 
end up emphasizing those weapons’ nonfunctional characteristics. For instance, 
opponents of such regulations typically argue that bans on assault weapons only 
target cosmetic features.
287
 That might or might not be a convincing policy ar-
gument,
288
 but in terms of picking out a “class of weapons” immune from pro-
hibition it is not just a dead end but a trap: if assault-weapons bans only reach 
 
283. See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae Disabled Veterans for Self-Defense and Kestra Childers in 
Support of Respondent at 29-30, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-
290) (noting that riﬂes are more dangerous to keep in the home because of their relative muz-
zle velocity); Brief Amicus Curiae of the Heartland Institute in Support of Respondent at 16-
17, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290) (noting that “[t]he vast majority of American gun own-
ers prefer handguns to other ﬁrearms for self-defense” and that “the FBI found that handguns 
accounted for over 83 percent of all ﬁrearms used in legally justiﬁed defensive homicides by 
private citizens, while shotguns and riﬂes together accounted for less than 7.5 percent of 
such”); Brief of Amici Curiae Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc. et al. in Support of Re-
spondent at 21, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290) (listing reasons why “[h]igh powered riﬂes 
are not recommended for self-defense,” including (1) the fact that dialing 911 while aiming 
one is difficult, (2) they are awkward to get into action quickly, and (3) they are less useful in 
close quarters (internal quotations omitted)). 
284. See infra notes 306-308 and accompanying text. 
285. Heller, 554 U.S. at 629. 
286. Cf. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“The same cannot be said of semiautomatic 
riﬂes.”). 
287. See, e.g., E. Gregory Wallace, “Assault Weapon” Myths, 44 SO. ILL. U. L.J. (2018); David Kopel, 
Guns, Mental Illness and Newtown, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 18, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB10001424127887323723104578185271857424036 [https://perma.cc/P532-C2TB] (“What 
some people call ‘assault weapons’ function like every other normal ﬁrearm—they ﬁre only 
one bullet each time the trigger is pressed.”). 
288. As compared to other classes of weapons, assault weapons (however deﬁned) are more likely 
to be used in mass shootings, including many if not most of the high-proﬁle shootings that 
garner national attention. Perhaps this is because the cosmetic features do have a “function”—
inciting terror or making the shooter feel more powerful—or simply because of a copycat re-
sponse. See William Cummings & Bart Jansen, Why the AR-15 Keeps Appearing at America’s 
Deadliest Mass Shootings, USA TODAY (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news
/nation/2018/02/14/ar-15-mass-shootings/339519002 [https://perma.cc/9W7V-66X9] (cit-
ing a ﬁrearms instructor’s belief that “mass shooters generally don’t know much about guns 
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cosmetic features, then they should have no functional impact at all on self-de-
fense. This does not mean that such laws are automatically constitutional; they 
might fail scrutiny on the basis that regulating cosmetic features is not a suffi-
cient government interest. But if assault-weapons bans really are simply prohi-
bitions on appearances, then from a functional perspective they do not burden 
the ability of rightsholders to defend themselves to a high-enough degree to 
make them per se invalid. 
An analogous set of questions has arisen in cases involving restrictions on 
public carry. Perhaps the most important and most divisive issue in Second 
Amendment law at the moment is whether and in what ways the right to keep 
and bear arms applies in public. Heller was clear that the Second Amendment 
includes a right to keep and bear a handgun for self-defense within the home, 
“where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”
289
 But 
how far that “core” extends beyond one’s front door has been the subject of in-
tense debate in case reporters
290
 and law reviews.
291
 
Courts have overwhelmingly held or assumed that the right to keep and bear 
arms has some application outside the home.
292
 Within the category of public 
carry, however, there is a major division between open and concealed carrying. 
Heller listed bans on concealed carry among the “longstanding prohibitions” that 
are presumptively lawful, noting that “the majority of the 19th-century courts to 
consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were 
 
and choose the AR-15 because of the reputation it has gotten from being used in other mass 
shootings”). 
289. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 (2008); id. at 629 (“Whatever the reason, handguns are the most pop-
ular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home, and a complete prohibition 
of their use is invalid.”). 
290. See, e.g., Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 660-61 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that 
“the individual right to carry common ﬁrearms beyond the home for self-defense—even in 
densely populated areas, even for those lacking special self-defense needs—falls within the 
core of the Second Amendment’s protections”); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th 
Cir. 2012) (“A right to bear arms thus implies a right to carry a loaded gun outside the 
home.”). 
291. See, e.g., Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 1278 (2009) (arguing for a “home-bound” interpretation of the Second 
Amendment right); Volokh, supra note 35, at 1515-33 (criticizing that position). 
292. See, e.g., Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430-32 (3d Cir. 2013) (assuming that the right to keep 
and bear arms has some application outside the home, but upholding a restriction on public 
carry nonetheless); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876-83 (4th Cir.) (same); Moore v. 
Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that the right to keep and bear arms has 
some application outside the home); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89, 101 
(2d Cir. 2012) (assuming that the right to keep and bear arms has some application outside 
the home, but upholding a restriction on public carry nonetheless). 
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lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues.”
293
 Courts applying 
Heller have overwhelmingly held that concealed carry falls outside the scope of 
the Amendment entirely.
294
 
What, then, is the relationship between open and concealed carry when eval-
uating the constitutionality of restrictions on one or the other? In keeping with 
the functional analysis, some courts and scholars have concluded that a total pro-
hibition on one is not subject to per se invalidity, so long as the other remains 
available.
295
 Conceptually, this is reminiscent of the debate in Murr about 
whether two adjacent parcels should be considered jointly (so that restrictions 
on the use of one parcel would not be a complete taking) or separately.
296
 Again, 
the question comes down to one of adequate alternatives. As with bans on classes 
of arms, prohibitions on particular means of carrying can be evaluated in func-
tional terms. From that perspective, the ban label should be reserved for gun 
regulations that deny individuals a particularly important (perhaps even unique) 
means of self-protection. 
One might ask whether, by evaluating the burden on a right as a means of 
identifying the level of scrutiny, the functional approach effectively puts the cart 
before the horse. This worry surfaced in a recent case in which the en banc Third 
Circuit upheld New Jersey’s prohibition on high-capacity magazines. After con-
cluding that the regulation did not burden the core of the right to keep and bear 
arms, the majority subjected the regulation to intermediate scrutiny.
297
 In dis-
sent, Judge Stephanos Bibas concluded that “[t]he law does not ban all maga-
zines, so it is not per se unconstitutional.”
298
 But he went on to criticize the ma-
jority for choosing to apply intermediate scrutiny based on the burden the law 
imposed, saying “we never demand evidence of how severely a law burdens or 
how many people it hinders before picking a tier of scrutiny. . . . Deciding the 
 
293. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
294. See, e.g., Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2013) (“In light of our nation’s 
extensive practice of restricting citizens’ freedom to carry ﬁrearms in a concealed manner, we 
hold that this activity does not fall within the scope of the Second Amendment’s protec-
tions.”). 
295. See, e.g., Norman v. State, 215 So. 3d 18, 28 (Fla. 2017) (upholding an open carry ban where 
the state generally allowed concealed carry); Jonathan Meltzer, Note, Open Carry for All: Hel-
ler and Our Nineteenth-Century Second Amendment, 123 YALE L.J. 1486 (2014) (arguing that 
open carry is covered by the Second Amendment, but concealed carry is not). 
296. See supra notes 181-184 and accompanying text. 
297. Ass’n of N.J. Riﬂe & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. N.J., 910 F.3d 106, 122 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(en banc). 
298. Id. at 128 (Bibas, J., dissenting). 
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severity of the burden before picking a tier of scrutiny is deciding the merits 
ﬁrst.”
299
 
And yet that is precisely what the ban characterization typically does. As the 
discussion here has attempted to show, the ban framework is essentially another 
way to use “the severity of the burden” to “decid[e] the merits,” albeit without 
resort to scrutiny of any kind. Bibas’s own approach, it should be noted, would 
avoid this problem—he would have applied strict scrutiny on the basis that the 
“core” of the right was burdened, rather than applying a per se rule of invalid-
ity.
300
 The point here is simply that the horse-cart objection is magniﬁed, not 
avoided, by the ban framework—including, as the following Section shows, the 
more formalist version of that framework that Bibas invoked. 
To be clear, the functional approach to bans is not the same as ad hoc interest 
balancing. Rather, it is a way of identifying those classes of cases (handgun bans, 
for example) in which the burden on a right is so high that no possible assertion 
of government interest can save the challenged law.
301
 The result is still per se 
invalidity; it is only that the trigger is identiﬁed by reference to the right-holder’s 
ability to pursue his or her constitutionally guaranteed interests. It follows that, 
whenever the question in a constitutional challenge is whether the government 
has gone too far in burdening a constitutional right, functionalism is to be pre-
ferred. 
Put another way, the goal of the functional approach is to identify the essen-
tials—the things that, if prohibited, would eviscerate the right itself. To do so is 
to protect not only the boundaries of constitutional rights, but their infrastruc-
ture; to mark the load-bearing walls and protect them from destruction. 
C. Formalism 
As described above, under the formal approach, certain things or activities 
are constitutionally protected by per se rules regardless of what functions they 
serve, or how much they matter in effectuating constitutional interests. This ap-
proach may be particularly attractive where the rights claim at issue is not instru-
mental—that is, where the question is not how much a regulation interferes with 
a constitutional interest, but whether the target of the prohibition has some 
 
299. Id. at 128-29; id. (“The availability of alternatives bears on whether the government satisﬁes 
strict scrutiny, not on whether strict scrutiny applies in the ﬁrst place.”). 
300. Id. at 129 (“[T]he only question is whether a law impairs the core of a constitutional right, 
whatever the right may be.”). 
301. In this way, it is almost the inverse of the “deﬁnitional balancing” approach described by Mel-
ville Nimmer, which is typically invoked to determine what forms of speech are uncovered by 
the First Amendment. Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guar-
antees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1192-93 (1970). 
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standalone constitutional value. The government cannot, for example, ban a 
class of persons or a religion on the basis that others are available, because the 
Constitution does not treat people or religions as being instrumental to some 
other end; their constitutional protection does not depend on their ability to per-
form a particular function. 
The question for the formal approach is to identify the classes—of arms, me-
diums of expression, and so on—that are protected by per se rules without ref-
erence to their functions. One can of course begin with the text of the Constitu-
tion, but it will rarely be determinate enough to provide useful bright lines. 
Surely the government cannot ban all speech or arms.
302
 But it is equally clear 
that it can ban some subcategories thereof, either because they are not covered 
by the Constitution or because such a ban survives the requisite level of scrutiny. 
The question is how to separate these categories formally without resorting to 
functionalism. 
Another possibility is to employ a kind of historical formalism: to ﬁnd in 
history or tradition the categories of objects or activities that are protected from 
prohibition,
303
 in roughly the same way that courts have tried to identify the 
objects or activities that are subject to prohibition. In the Second Amendment 
context, courts already employ this approach when evaluating the threshold 
question of whether particular classes of arms or mediums of expression are cov-
ered by the Constitution. Longstanding prohibitions on guns—including bans 
on concealed carrying, possession by felons or the mentally ill, or for that matter 
“dangerous and unusual weapons”—are generally carved out of Second Amend-
ment coverage and trigger no constitutional scrutiny at all.
304
 The same, at least 
 
302. See, e.g., Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987) (striking 
down an ordinance forbidding “all First Amendment activities” in the Los Angeles airport). 
Still, as Lawrence Tribe and Michael Dorf note, the law “did not, after all, purport to ban all 
‘speech,’ but only those ‘First Amendment activities’ that take place in the Los Angeles air-
port.” Tribe & Dorf, supra note 126, at 1062. 
303. Historicism and categoricalism tend to travel together, though whether the presence of a rule 
triggers historical inquiry or vice versa is hard to say. Cf. Jamal Greene, Rule Originalism, 116 
COLUM. L. REV. 1639, 1654 (2016) (“U.S. constitutional culture tends to rely on originalist 
methods in resolving questions about constitutional rules and tends to use nonoriginalist 
methods in resolving questions about constitutional standards.”). 
304. For examples of courts ﬁnding that these carve-outs create bright-line exclusions, see National 
Riﬂe Ass’n of America v. ATF, 700 F.3d 185, 196 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 
1180, 1183 (8th Cir. 2011); and United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010). See 
also Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1897) (observing that “the ﬁrst ten amend-
ments to the constitution” protect rights that are “subject to certain well-recognized excep-
tions” and that the Second Amendment right “is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carry-
ing of concealed weapons”). Some courts treat the exclusions as rebuttable presumptions. See, 
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according to some cases, is true of traditionally unprotected categories of speech, 
such as libel.
305
 One can imagine doing the same at the other end of the spec-
trum: using history to deﬁne not only the classes that are categorically unpro-
tected, but those that are categorically protected. 
Historical formalism is usually presented as an alternative to the functional-
ist approach. Again, Heller provides a useful illustration. Like the Court of Ap-
peals, the Supreme Court had little patience for the argument that D.C.’s law 
permitted a wide range of arms that could be used in self-defense: “It is no an-
swer to say, as petitioners do, that it is permissible to ban the possession of hand-
guns so long as the possession of other ﬁrearms (i.e., long guns) is allowed.”
306
 
As noted above,
307
 one might read this as a conclusion that D.C.’s law was a 
functional ban, on the basis that handguns are uniquely and essentially valuable 
for self-defense; if the Court struck the law down because of the “burden” it 
imposed,
308
 Heller might best be understood as taking a functional approach to 
the right to bear arms. 
But one might also read the majority as embracing a formalist approach. Re-
call that Heller carves out “dangerous and unusual” weapons from Second 
Amendment coverage, based on their historical regulation.
309
 One can imagine 
 
e.g., Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 686, 690 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc); 
United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010). 
305. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. 
306. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008). At oral argument, the Chief Justice 
was even sharper: “So if you have a law that prohibits the possession of books, it’s all right if 
you allow the possession of newspapers?” Transcript of Oral Argument at 18-19, Heller, 554 
U.S. 570 (No. 07-290). The Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion: 
The District contends that since it only bans one type of ﬁrearm, “residents still 
have access to hundreds more,” and thus its prohibition does not implicate the Sec-
ond Amendment because it does not threaten total disarmament. We think that 
argument frivolous. It could be similarly contended that all ﬁrearms may be banned 
so long as sabers were permitted. 
  Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Of course, to say that some 
alternatives are adequate for self-defense does not mean that all of them are—a shotgun might 
be a self-defense substitute for a handgun, even if a saber is not. Permitting bans on speciﬁc 
classes of weapons is not the same as allowing “total disarmament.” 
307. See supra text accompanying notes 283-286. 
308. See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 632 (distinguishing colonial gunpowder restrictions because “they 
do not remotely burden the right of self-defense as much as an absolute ban on handguns”); 
Volokh, supra note 35, at 1456 (“The Court did not discuss what analysis would be proper for 
less ‘severe’ restrictions, likely because it had no occasion to. But its analysis suggested that 
the severity of the burden was important.”). 
309. See, e.g., United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 600 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he longstanding limita-
tions mentioned by the Court in Heller are exceptions to the right to bear arms.”). 
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a converse principle under which certain classes of arms are immune from pro-
hibition because of how they were treated historically—regardless of whether 
adequate alternatives are available. The challenge, of course, would be in identi-
fying those classes of arms in a principled manner without resorting to function-
alism. 
One could, for example, attempt to deﬁne these classes of arms based on 
whether they are “lineal descendant[s]” of arms protected at the Founding.
310
 
Such efforts, like others attempting to build analogical bridges across two cen-
turies of social and technological change, demand a fair bit of judicial imagina-
tion.
311
 Is the modern AR-15 a “lineal descendant” of the colonial-era musket? 
Guns have no progeny, so one cannot trace their lineage directly through some 
kind of family tree. Instead, one must employ analogies,
312
 which depend on the 
identiﬁcation of relevant similarities.
313
 
There is nothing necessarily nefarious about such an inquiry; analogies are 
an essential part of legal reasoning.
314
 But it is hard to imagine what character-
istics of ﬁrearms are relevant other than their functionality—how well they serve 
as self-defense weapons, for example. And if lineal descendants are to be deﬁned 
based on their functional similarity, then formalism becomes little more than 
functionalism in disguise. 
At least with regard to class-of-arms claims, then, it is difficult to see how a 
formal approach can identify per se protected categories based solely on histori-
cal analysis. At the very least, courts would have to engage in wide-ranging anal-
ogies dependent on judges’ perceptions of relevant similarities. And that, in turn, 
would most likely involve precisely the kind of judicial discretion that advocates 
of formalism typically seek to avoid. 
 
310. Parker, 478 F.3d at 398. 
311. See, for example, Justice Alito’s comments at oral argument in Brown v. Entertainment Mer-
chants Association: “Well, I think what Justice Scalia wants to know is what James Madison 
thought about video games. Did he enjoy them?” Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Brown 
v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (No. 08-1448). 
312. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (concluding that in 
cases involving modern weapons, “the proper interpretive approach is to reason by analogy 
from history and tradition”). 
313. See Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 744 (1993) (“For ana-
logical reasoning to work well, we have to say that the relevant, known similarities give us 
good reason to believe that there are further similarities and thus help to answer an open 
question.”). See generally LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL 
ARGUMENT (2005) (describing the use of analogies in legal argumentation). 
314. EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2 (1949) (“The ﬁnding of similar-
ity or difference is the key step in the legal process.”). 
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Instead of relying on history, however, the formalist approach could instead 
focus on contemporary patterns of use. Perhaps handgun bans are per se invalid 
not because of handguns’ functional utility (at least not directly), nor because of 
their historical lineage, but precisely because they are the “most popular 
weapon” for purposes of self-defense.
315
 This would represent a kind of special 
case for the “common use” test, which courts generally employ as a threshold for 
determining whether an arm is covered by the Second Amendment at all,
316
 but 
which could theoretically also be used to identify those weapons that are not only 
covered but immune from prohibition. In their dissent from denial of certiorari 
in Friedman v. City of Highland Park (a Seventh Circuit case in which Judge 
Easterbrook evaluated the availability of “adequate means of self-defense”),
317
 
for example, Justices Scalia and Thomas claimed that “Heller asks whether the 
law bans types of ﬁrearms commonly used for a lawful purpose—regardless of 
whether alternatives exist.”
318
 
Friedman involved a prohibition on assault weapons, which appear to be 
popular with gun owners.
319
 Some have argued that the popularity of assault 
weapons means they are in common use and thus covered by the Second Amend-
ment.
320
 The Friedman dissent would take this a step further and hold that their 
popularity not only means that they are constitutionally covered, but also that 
they are immune from prohibition. 
 
315. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008). 
316. See, e.g., Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436, 451 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Machineguns are dangerous and 
unusual and therefore not in common use. They do not receive Second Amendment protec-
tion . . . .”); United States v. One (1) Palmetto State Armory PA-15 Machinegun Re-
ceiver/Frame, 822 F.3d 136, 142 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[W]e repeat today that the Second Amend-
ment does not protect the possession of machine guns. They are not in common use for lawful 
purposes.”). 
317. 784 F.3d 406, 410 (2015). 
318. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 449 (2015) (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari). 
319. See Kate Irby, Nobody Knows Exactly How Many Assault Riﬂes Exist in the U.S.—by Design, 
MCCLATCHY D.C. (Feb. 23, 2018, 6:21 PM), https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation 
-world/national/article201882739.html [https://perma.cc/US32-GU8F]. 
320. See, e.g., Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 153 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (Traxler, J., dissenting) (“Be-
tween 1990 and 2012, more than 8 million AR- and AK- platform semiautomatic riﬂes alone 
were manufactured in or imported into the United States. In 2012, semiautomatic sporting 
riﬂes accounted for twenty percent of all retail ﬁrearms sales. . . . In terms of absolute num-
bers, these statistics lead to the unavoidable conclusion that popular semiautomatic riﬂes such 
as the AR-15 are commonly possessed by American citizens for lawful purposes within the 
meaning of Heller.”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 469 (2017) (mem.). 
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An obvious difficulty with this approach is that it could worsen the well-rec-
ognized difficulties with the “common-use” test.
321
 How popular must a weapon 
be to be in “common use”? By whom must it be used and for what purposes? 
Can popularity immunize classes of weapons that might otherwise be carved out 
of constitutional coverage, such as dangerous or unusual weapons? Does the rule 
operate as a one-way ratchet, only increasing the classes of arms immune from 
prohibition, or can the rarity of a weapon place it outside Second Amendment 
coverage? As with the historical-formal approach, answering these questions 
will inevitably involve judicial discretion. Moreover, and perhaps more trou-
bling, a formal common-use approach would likely obscure the nature of that 
discretion.
322
 If the analysis is ultimately a functional one involving signiﬁcant 
judicial discretion, it seems preferable that this be acknowledged. 
Formalism is especially ill-suited to resolving class-of-arms cases, for the 
simple reason that arms are instruments. They are constitutionally protected be-
cause of their function, and so a functional analysis seems the most intuitive way 
to resolve the question of whether a regulation impermissibly burdens their use. 
But other aspects of the right to keep and bear arms—which “people” it protects, 
for example, or what it means to “bear”—might be better suited to a historical-
formal approach. 
In cases restricting who can access or use arms, for example, it seems inap-
propriate to ask whether adequate alternatives exist: it is not particularly helpful 
to tell a litigant that she can be denied weapons because others can still use them. 
Some courts evaluating permitting requirements for public carry have thus used 
formalist analysis to approach this question. Again, the D.C. Circuit’s decisions 
are illustrative. Historically, some jurisdictions have required people to demon-
strate good cause before receiving a permit to carry a gun in public.
323
 After D.C. 
adopted such a restriction in the wake of Heller, some D.C. residents argued that 
this requirement, as applied, amounted to an unconstitutional ban. In Wrenn v. 
District of Columbia, the majority of a divided D.C. Circuit panel agreed: “[I]f 
Heller I dictates a certain treatment of ‘total bans’ on Second Amendment rights, 
that treatment must apply to total bans on carrying (or possession) by ordinarily 
 
321. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 35, at 1480-81 (describing “[t]he difficulty with a ‘dangerous and 
unusual weapons’ test”). 
322. See Frederick Schauer, Analogy in the Supreme Court: Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida, 
2013 SUP. CT. REV. 405, 422 (noting that people “draw their analogies . . . often without ever 
going to or even seeing the level of abstraction or generalization that . . . undergirds their 
judgments”). 
323. See Joseph Blocher, Good Cause Requirements for Carrying Guns in Public, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 
218, 218-19 (2014). 
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situated individuals covered by the Amendment.”
324
 The panel struck down 
D.C.’s law using what it called a “categorical approach” but emphasized that its 
holding “rest[ed] on a rule so narrow that good-reason laws seem almost 
uniquely designed to defy it: that the law-abiding citizen’s right to bear common 
arms must enable the typical citizen to carry a gun.”
325
 
Although good-cause restrictions have been nearly universally upheld,
326
 
Wrenn was not entirely unique in its methodology or conclusion.
327
 A year later, 
in Young v. Hawaii, the Ninth Circuit used similar reasoning in evaluating Ha-
waii’s restriction, which—like the D.C. Circuit in Wrenn—it understood to be a 
ban.
328
 The Ninth Circuit concluded that “[t]he typical, law-abiding citizen in 
the State of Hawaii is . . . entirely foreclosed from exercising the core Second 
Amendment right to bear arms for self-defense.”
329
 Hawaii’s permitting law 
thus “‘amounts to a destruction’ of a core right, and as such, it is inﬁrm ‘[u]nder 
any of the standards of scrutiny.’”
330
 This was not a functional analysis: the case 
does not turn on whether the law imposed too much of a burden on self-defense 
rights (although, as noted above, that is one way to evaluate the constitutionality 
of bans on either open or concealed carry).
331
 Rather, the central question had to 
do with the scope of the Second Amendment itself—and, in particular, whether 
it guarantees the right of the “typical, law-abiding citizen” to carry guns in pub-
lic. That is a question that can, at least in theory, be answered with regard to 
history or some other nominally formalist method. That, in turn, suggests that 
formalism might be preferable to functionalism in those situations where the 
scope of the right—or some essential subpart thereof—can be established on his-
torical or conceptual grounds, and a law effectively prohibits its exercise. 
 
324. 864 F.3d 650, 666 (D.C. Cir. 2017); see also Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 946 
(9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Callahan, J., dissenting) (describing a local good-cause restriction 
as “a total ban on the right of an ordinary citizen to carry a ﬁrearm in public for self-defense”). 
325. Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 666-68. 
326. See, e.g., Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 662 (1st Cir. 2018); Peruta, 824 F.3d 919; Drake v. 
Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013); Ka-
chalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012). 
327. See Radich v. Guerrero, No. 14-0020, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41877, at *7 (D. N. Mar. I. Mar. 
28, 2016) (striking down a restriction in the Northern Mariana Islands that prohibited most 
private individuals from possessing and importing handguns and handgun ammunition, not-
ing that “the Commonwealth’s ban on handguns cannot be squared with the Second Amend-
ment right described in Heller and McDonald”). 
328. No. 12-17808, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20525, at *64 (9th Cir. July 24, 2018). 
329. Id. at *56-57. 
330. Id. at *57 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008)). 
331. See supra notes 289-291 and accompanying text. 
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One might object to the premises and reasoning of these cases on Second 
Amendment grounds (i.e., that the “core” right does not extend outside the 
home), or on any of the grounds usually leveled against historical, rule-based 
jurisprudence. But with regard to the conceptual treatment of bans, Wrenn’s ap-
proach is at the very least defensible: if the word “bear” connotes a right of law-
abiding citizens to carry weapons outside the home and D.C.’s law prevented 
that, then a rule of per se invalidity makes sense on formalist grounds. That puts 
a lot of pressure on the initial, deﬁnitional determination, and the reasoning be-
hind that determination should be transparent. In any event, the debate is about 
the premises. 
In sum, it seems that a formal approach to bans will in most cases—including 
those that begin with historical analysis—almost inevitably lead back to func-
tionalism. And to the degree that this is so, the functional analysis should be 
transparent. But there are some constitutional claims, including in the Second 
Amendment context, that are fundamentally nonfunctional. Where the scope of 
the right can be established on a nonfunctional basis, and a regulation would 
deny it entirely, then a rule of per se invalidity is justiﬁed without resort to a 
functional analysis. 
D. Purposivism 
A ﬁnal set of per se rules involves government restrictions that appear to be 
motivated by an improper purpose, such as animus. Under this purposivist 
framework, the ban label is typically shorthand for laws that—sometimes as a 
result of their underbreadth—impermissibly target viewpoints, racial groups, 
and the like. 
As noted above, Jamal Greene has recently argued that “[t]he rights-as-
trumps frame might well suit a rights regime whose paradigm cases are patho-
logical, where courts must defend the very existence of individual rights against 
government bigotry, intolerance, or corruption.”
332
 Whether a law can be called 
a ban could be relevant to that inquiry precisely because a law’s impact might be 
evidence of its purpose.
333
 If, for example, the burdens of a law fall exclusively 
on a particular activity or group of people (even if not all of them), that fact 
might be taken as evidence that the law is motivated by “government bigotry, 
intolerance, or corruption.” And that, in turn, might be especially relevant when 
 
332. Greene, supra note 12, at 127-28. 
333. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943) (striking down prohibition on 
door-to-door distribution of literature in part because “[t]he dangers of distribution can so 
easily be controlled by traditional legal methods . . . that stringent prohibition can serve no 
purpose but that forbidden by the Constitution, the naked restriction of the dissemination of 
ideas”). 
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it comes to rights such as equal protection, free speech, and free exercise that are 
sensitive to government motive. In such cases, the ban characterization is a proxy 
for other kinds of constitutional harm. 
The debate over President Trump’s suspension of the entry of travelers from 
Muslim-majority countries provides a case in point. As a presidential candidate, 
Trump called for a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the 
United States.”
334
 The executive orders he signed upon taking office did not go 
quite that far, but—because they overwhelmingly burdened Muslims and Mus-
lim-majority countries—were often described as a “Muslim Ban.”
335
 
In Trump v. Hawaii, the Supreme Court considered whether one of those ex-
ecutive actions—a proclamation restricting travel to the United States by citizens 
of seven named countries
336
—violated the Establishment Clause. At oral argu-
ment, Solicitor General Noel Francisco disputed the characterization of the Proc-
lamation as a ban: 
This is not a so-called Muslim ban. If it were, it would be the most inef-
fective Muslim ban that one could possibly imagine since not only does 
it exclude the vast majority of the Muslim world, it also omits three Mus-
lim-majority countries that were covered by past orders, including Iraq, 
Chad, and Sudan.
337
 
 
334. Press Release, Donald J. Trump for President, Donald J. Trump Statement on Muslim  
Immigration (Dec. 7, 2015), https://web.archive.org/web/20151207230751/https:// 
www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trump-statement-on-preventing 
-muslim-immigration [https://perma.cc/BYW5-XSHN]. The original press release was sub-
sequently removed from the campaign website. 
335. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2435-41 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (sum-
marizing statements by the Trump Campaign or Administration expressing animus towards 
Muslims and explicitly identifying the policy as a “Muslim Ban”); Amy B. Wang, Trump Asked 
for a ‘Muslim Ban,’ Giuliani Says—and Ordered a Commission to Do It ‘Legally,’ WASH. POST 
(Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-ﬁx/wp/2017/01/29/trump 
-asked-for-a-muslim-ban-giuliani-says-and-ordered-a-commission-to-do-it-legally 
[https://perma.cc/2LKM-6NWC]. 
336. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017). 
337. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965); see also Statement by  
Press Secretary Sean Spicer, WHITE HOUSE PRESS OFF. (Jan. 31, 2017, 1:09 PM EST), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/statement-press-secretary-sean-spicer-2 
[https://perma.cc/N9LP-CDCD] (“It can’t be a ban if you’re letting a million people in. If 
325,000 people from another country can’t come in, that is by nature not a ban . . . .”). 
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Justice Alito signaled his agreement.
338
 Neal Katyal, arguing for the State of Ha-
waii, framed the issue differently: “This is a ban that really does fall almost ex-
clusively on Muslims, between 90.2 percent and 99.8 percent Muslims.”
339
 
Francisco took the world’s Muslim population as the denominator, empha-
sizing the Proclamation’s underbreadth with regard to that group. Katyal instead 
focused on the Proclamation’s impact and what it suggested about the govern-
ment’s motive—it banned something, after all, and that something was, over-
whelmingly, Muslims. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for a ﬁve-Justice majority 
appeared to adopt Francisco’s framing, concluding that the disproportionate 
burden on Muslims was not enough to demonstrate religious hostility,
340
 let 
alone to constitute a ban. 
Many of the constitutional issues in Trump v. Hawaii were particular to the 
case: the relevance of official animus toward a religious group, for example,
341
 
and the relevance of campaign statements in demonstrating that animus.
342
 But 
the same questions arise in other areas of constitutional law where the govern-
ment’s motive is of paramount importance. The Equal Protection Clause is an 
obvious example. Some have argued that the Free Speech Clause should be in-
terpreted in such a fashion as well.
343
 
There are at least two ways to understand the relevance of government mo-
tive in these cases. One is that the presence of an impermissible purpose (coupled 
with at least some kind of impact) is itself fatal to the attempted regulation—the 
 
338. Transcript of Oral Argument at 64, Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965) (“I mean, there 
are . . . 50 predominantly Muslim countries in the world. Five . . . predominantly Muslim 
countries are on this list. The population of the predominantly Muslim countries on this list 
make up 8 percent of the world’s Muslim population.”). 
339. Id. at 66. 
340. See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2421 (noting that even though ﬁve of the seven nations have a Muslim 
majority, that fact alone “does not support an inference of religious hostility, given that the 
policy covers just 8% of the world’s Muslim population and is limited to countries that were 
previously designated by Congress or prior administrations as posing national security 
risks”). 
341. See Hawai’i v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1135 (D. Haw. 2017) (“The notion that one can 
demonstrate animus toward any group of people only by targeting all of them at once is fun-
damentally ﬂawed. The Court declines to relegate its Establishment Clause analysis to a 
purely mathematical exercise. . . . ‘It is a discriminatory purpose that matters, no matter how 
inefficient the execution.’” (citations omitted)). 
342. See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2435-41 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (summarizing statements 
by the Trump Campaign expressing animus towards Muslims and explicitly identifying the 
policy as a “Muslim Ban”). 
343. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 200, at 414 (“[N]otwithstanding the Court’s protestations . . . First 
Amendment law, as developed by the Supreme Court over the past several decades, has as its 
primary, though unstated, object the discovery of improper governmental motives.”). 
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ban. That is true of the Equal Protection Clause, for example, since the substance 
of the guarantee is itself one against particular kinds of impact and intent.
344
 
Indeed, the Court has emphasized that “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group” can never constitute a legitimate government interest
345
— 
effectively creating a per se rule against laws motivated by such a desire. Charac-
terizing President Trump’s Proclamation as a ban was, from the challengers’ per-
spective, a way of attempting to trigger a per se rule of invalidity. 
A second way that government motive and the ban label might interact is 
more forward looking. To call something a ban is to show government animus 
toward the constitutional entitlement and therefore to raise the specter of further 
and broader bans going forward.
346
 On this account, a ban that reveals animus 
or a lack of respect for the right should trigger per se invalidity (or something 
like it), because to do otherwise would be to invite the eventual evisceration of 
the right. 
In the particular context of identifying government animus, the ban label 
tends to emphasize the action’s underbreadth with regard to its legitimate tar-
gets. Where a regulation solely or disproportionately reaches a particular class or 
category that does not coincide with the interest being asserted, the govern-
ment’s motive might be questioned. This was the argument of the challengers 
in Trump v. Hawaii, who emphasized that more than ninety percent of the people 
denied entry were Muslim.
347
 One might say the same of, for example, stop-and-
frisk policies that disproportionately impact minorities.
348
 
Both kinds of argument (bias alone and slippery slope) often arise in the 
Second Amendment context. When the Senate considered expanding back-
 
344. See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that disparate impact alone 
is insufficient to make an Equal Protection Clause claim). 
345. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). The past few years have seen an 
outpouring of important scholarship on the concept of animus. See, e.g., WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, 
ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW (2017); Leslie Kendrick & Micah 
Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 133 (2018); Pollvogt, supra note 16, 
at 888. 
346. Cf. Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984) (uphold-
ing a ban on public posters in Los Angeles due in part to the fact that there is no evidence that 
“appellees’ ability to communicate effectively is threatened by ever-increasing restrictions on 
expression”). 
347. See supra text accompanying note 339. 
348. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Blacks and 
Hispanics are more likely than whites to be stopped within precincts and census tracts, even 
after controlling for other relevant variables.”). 
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ground-check requirements in the wake of the Newtown massacre—an over-
whelmingly popular proposal, even among gun owners
349
—the NRA described 
it as part of “an anti-gun agenda that seeks to restrict ﬁrearm ownership in 
America—as much as they can, however they can, and as soon as they can.”
350
 
Scholars continue to debate whether the high failure rate of Second Amendment 
claims evidences judicial hostility to gun-rights claims.
351
 Some argue that the 
Second Amendment is being treated as a “second-class right”
352
 or even, as Jus-
tice Thomas put it, a “constitutional orphan.”
353
 
The NRA, in effect, has the same position as the challengers in Trump v. Ha-
waii. The argument is that laws targeting guns (and not targeting, or not target-
ing enough, other sources of crime and mayhem) are evidence of government 
bias against guns. The ban characterization suggests that judges must overcome 
their own biases against the right to keep and bear arms and maintain the starch 
in the rules when that right is under attack.
354
 It enlists constitutional doctrine 
 
349. See Mark Glaze, Opinion, Americans, Even NRA Members, Want Gun Reforms, CNN (Feb. 1, 
2013, 7:42 AM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2013/01/31/opinion/glaze-gun-control 
[https://perma.cc/3P9R-EDA7] (stating that “74% of NRA members” support background 
checks); Daniel Webster, Opinion, N.R.A. Members vs. N.R.A. Leaders, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM 
FOR DEBATE (Jan. 8, 2016, 1:43 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/12/17
/is-the-gun-lobby-invincible/nra-members-vs-nra-leaders [https://perma.cc/N6DF-YY6E] 
(“[E]xtreme stances by the N.R.A. will certainly make some gun owners speak out for com-
mon sense reforms . . . .”). 
350. Senate to Take Up Anti-Gun Legislation Soon!, NRA INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION (Apr. 5, 2013), 
https://www.nraila.org/articles/20130405/senate-to-take-up-anti-gun-legislation-soon 
[https://perma.cc/V3ZL-FDJC]. 
351. See sources cited supra note 204. 
352. See, e.g., Mance v. Sessions, 896 F.3d 390, 398 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Ho, J., dissenting); 
Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 945 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Callahan, J., 
dissenting); see also Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2292 (2016) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting) (“[T]he Court continues to ‘relegat[e] the Second Amendment to a second-class 
right.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 
447, 450 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari))); Samaha & Germano, 
supra note 204, at 69 (evaluating data showing low rates of success for Second Amendment 
claims and concluding that there are alternative explanations besides second-class treatment). 
353. Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari). 
354. Cf. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 774 (1996) (Souter, 
J., concurring) (“Reviewing speech regulations under fairly strict categorical rules keeps the 
starch in the standards for those moments when the daily politics cries loudest for limiting 
what may be said.”). 
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to protect what in Elysian terms might be called a political-process failure
355
 or 
to defend one side in what Justice Scalia called the “culture war.”
356
 
It is certainly beyond the scope of this Article to establish whether there is 
bias (and, if so, how much) against the right to keep and bear arms.
357
 On the 
one hand, all branches of the federal government supported Heller’s central con-
clusion regarding the right to keep and bear arms for private purposes. Majori-
ties in both houses of Congress ﬁled briefs supporting the plaintiff’s reading of 
the Second Amendment, as did the Department of Justice (while arguing that 
D.C.’s law was consistent with that right). The decision was rendered in the 
midst of a presidential election, and both major candidates supported it.
358
 Per-
haps most important, as noted above, a strong majority of Americans supports 
the private-purposes reading of the Second Amendment and opposes conﬁsca-
tory gun control.
359
 In short, it is hard to make a purposivist case for heightened 
or bright-line rules of invalidity, given that gun-rights advocates do not appear 
to be suffering broad political-process failures in the gun debate.
360
 If anything, 
the balance seems to have been struck against the majority of Americans who 
support broader gun regulations.
361
 
Others, however, would argue that this is missing the forest for the trees, and 
that the hidden ambition of gun regulation is either to express disapproval of 
guns and gun owners
362
 or ultimately to disarm them.
363
 After all, millions of 
 
355. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1980). 
356. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is clear from this that 
the Court has taken sides in the culture war, departing from its role of assuring, as neutral 
observer, that the democratic rules of engagement are observed.”). 
357. See generally BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 214, at 183-91 (noting that some scholars, judges, 
Justices, and advocates argue that the Second Amendment is being treated as a second-class 
right, and questioning whether evidence supports this view). 
358. See Dina Temple-Raston, Supreme Court: Individuals Have Right to Bear Arms, NAT’L PUB. RA-
DIO (June 26, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=91911807 
[https://perma.cc/Y386-JQ5Z]. 
359. See Lydia Saad, Americans Want Stricter Gun Laws, Still Oppose Bans, GALLUP (Dec. 27, 2012), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/159569/americans-stricter-gun-laws-oppose-bans.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/8AUW-TQ4G]. 
360. See Sunstein, supra note 225, at 260; J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Un-
raveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 303 (2009). 
361. See Saad, supra note 359. 
362. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 456-62 (1999). 
363. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Gun Rights Talk, 94 B.U. L. REV. 813, 821-24 (2014) (collecting ex-
amples of such rhetoric). 
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Americans support stringent gun regulation,
364
 and many would just as soon see 
Heller overturned
365
 or the Second Amendment repealed.
366
 And those opinions 
tend to be concentrated in places—cities, primarily—that might pass stringent 
gun regulations.
367
 So it is not impossible to imagine a law being passed, and 
even justiﬁed, based on seeming hostility to the right to bear arms itself. 
Still, the fact that some are hostile to the right to bear arms need not mean 
that the right is sensitive to government motive. For instance, one can imagine 
widespread opposition to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal 
cases. But that would not mean that the right was therefore sensitive to motive: 
the Sixth Amendment requires that indigent criminal defendants be provided 
counsel, regardless of the government’s motive for denying it. 
This raises a deeper question: how much and in what ways is the Second 
Amendment sensitive to government motive? If the Second Amendment is cen-
trally concerned with what Greene calls “government bigotry, intolerance, or 
corruption,”
368
 then focusing on bans might indeed be a good way to identify 
situations that—like viewpoint discrimination or racial animus—should trigger 
per se invalidity. 
Although the rhetoric of animus is powerful, its application in Second 
Amendment cases does raise particular difficulties. Under most purposivist ap-
proaches, what is forbidden are laws directed at the constitutional right as such; 
those that incidentally burden the right while pursuing some other end are less 
 
364. R.J. Reinhart, Six in 10 Americans Support Stricter Gun Laws, GALLUP (Oct. 17, 2018), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/243797/six-americans-support-stricter-gun-laws.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/7NZQ-QMG3] (ﬁnding that sixty-one percent of Americans favor stricter 
gun control, and that twenty-eight percent favor handgun bans). 
365. Justice Ginsburg, to take just one example, has called Heller a “very bad decision” and sug-
gested that the Court reconsider it. Adam Liptak, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, No Fan of Donald 
Trump, Critiques Latest Term, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com
/2016/07/11/us/politics/ruth-bader-ginsburg-no-fan-of-donald-trump-critiques-latest 
-term.html [https://perma.cc/5KDS-ZMXA]; see also Chris W. Cox, Justice Ginsburg Reminds 
Us What Is at Stake in November, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION (Feb. 13, 2012), 
http://www.nraila.org/news-issues/articles/2012/justice-ginsburg-reminds-us-what-is-at 
-stake-in-november.aspx [https://perma.cc/LB38-TEM8]. 
366. See, e.g., Bret Stephens, Opinion, Repeal the Second Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/opinion/guns-second-amendment-nra.html 
[https://perma.cc/25WG-HXYP]; John Paul Stevens, Opinion, Repeal the Second Amendment, 
N.Y. Times (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/opinion/john-paul 
-stevens-repeal-second-amendment.html [https://perma.cc/F8SU-5PR3]. 
367. See Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 133-37 (2013). 
368. Greene, supra note 12, at 128. 
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suspect.
369
 Thus, to use a familiar example, a ﬂag burner can be prosecuted for 
littering, but not because of the viewpoint they mean to express.
370
 The hard 
question is what the equivalent inquiry would look like in a Second Amendment 
case, because nearly every gun regulation—as courts overwhelmingly recog-
nize—can be characterized as furthering public safety, “a primary concern of 
every government.”
371
 One might argue that such laws are ineffective or mis-
guided, but that is not enough to show animus against the relevant constitu-
tional interest. If the basic lodestar of the Second Amendment is the core interest 
of armed self-defense, then one would need to show that gun regulations are 
motivated by a desire to prevent armed self-defense as such—rather than, for 
example, that they do so incidentally as a means of furthering public safety. That 
seems a high bar, but it is beyond the scope of this Article to rule it out entirely. 
As with the First Amendment, then, there is no single correct approach to 
bans in the Second Amendment context. The choice will depend (just as it does 
in the free-speech context) on the type of claim being raised, and one’s underly-
ing theory of the right. Because the vast majority of Second Amendment claims 
allege that the government has deprived individuals of the ability to effectuate 
the right to keep and bear arms, a functional approach generally makes the most 
sense. Where a law makes it impossible for people to defend themselves with 
guns, for example, a per se rule is justiﬁed. But if a law simply prohibits one class 
of weapons, or one means of carrying them, then application of a per se rule will 
usually be inappropriate. 
In a certain subset of cases, however, per se rules might be justiﬁed even 
without resort to functional analysis. If a law denies a conceptually essential part 
of the right—public carry, arguably—then the functional burden is irrelevant. 
But such cases are likely to be limited in the Second Amendment context, and in 
any event depend on the precise identiﬁcation of such parts, which itself involves 
hard judicial work. The role of purposivism is even more limited. 
 
369. See, e.g., Srikanth Srinivasan, Incidental Restrictions of Speech and the First Amendment: A Mo-
tive-Based Rationalization of the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 401 
(1995) (arguing that the Court’s incidental speech restriction cases reﬂect an effort to identify 
improper governmental motive). 
370. Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 3-6 (1998). 
371. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[A]lmost 
every gun-control regulation will seek to advance (as the one here does) a ‘primary concern 
of every government—a concern for the safety and indeed the lives of its citizens.’”). 
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conclusion 
As this Article was being ﬁnalized, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a 
Second Amendment case for the ﬁrst time in many years.
372
 The case, New York 
Riﬂe & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, involves a challenge to a New York City 
rule that effectively made it illegal to transport a gun, even locked and unloaded, 
outside the city (including, for example, to a second home or a shooting range). 
Like the handgun bans struck down in Heller and McDonald (the only two of 
their kind), this one was apparently unique
373
—and probably would have suf-
fered the same fate, had New York City not done away with it after certiorari was 
granted. The more important question is whether and how the Court will decide 
to alter the existing Second Amendment framework more broadly.
374
 
For present purposes, what is interesting is the framing of the case, which 
the certiorari petition describes as involving a ban.
375
 On which of the three ap-
proaches discussed above does this framing make the most sense? The petition-
ers have embraced the purposivist approach, repeatedly arguing that the Second 
Amendment is being treated as a “second-class right.”
376
 If the Court buys into 
this frame—which likely depends on whether it agrees that the “one-of-a-kind” 
New York City rule is nonetheless representative of broader trends
377
—the deci-
sion could portend major changes to Second Amendment doctrine, including 
perhaps an increased reliance on per se rules across the board. 
Alternatively, the Court might decline to endorse the motive-based analysis 
and approach the ban through a more formalist lens. For instance, the Court 
might hold that the right to travel with a gun is an essential element of the right 
to “bear” one. Like Wrenn,
378
 this case could be narrowly resolved as a per se 
invalid ban that—like a ban on publishing, perhaps—destroys a basic feature of 
the right itself. After all, New York City’s rule ﬂatly prohibited people from 
 
372. N.Y. State Riﬂe & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 
139 S. Ct. 939 (2019). 
373. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1-2, NYSRPA, 139 S. Ct. 939 (No. 18-280) (describing the 
law as “one-of-a-kind”); id. at 3 (describing the case as an “extreme outlier three times over”). 
374. In the interests of full disclosure, I should note that I have ﬁled a brief in support of neither 
side, generally defending the existing framework. Brief of Second Amendment Law Profes-
sors as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, NYSRPA, 139 S. Ct. 939 (No. 18-280). 
375. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 373, at i (describing question presented). 
376. Id. at 21 (“While this Court has declared that the right to bear arms is not ‘a second-class 
right,’ many local governments and lower courts continue to treat it as such.”). 
377. Id. (“[T]hough the City’s bizarre transport ban is one of a kind, it is exemplary of a broader 
push by local governments to restrict Second Amendment rights through means that would 
never ﬂy in any other constitutional context.”). 
378. See supra notes 324-325 and accompanying text. 
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transporting guns from a primary to a second residence outside the city, even 
though the core of the right under Heller is self-defense in the home. 
But again, the functional approach has much to recommend it. After all, pe-
titioners do not argue that the transport of weapons has any kind of intrinsic 
value—it would be an empty right that allowed them only to drive in and out of 
the city with locked and unloaded weapons. The potential problem with the law, 
and the reason it might be described as a ban, is that it places such a signiﬁcant 
obstacle in the way of furthering the “core” constitutional interest of self-de-
fense. 
The point here, and the importance of the case, is more about method than 
result, and is more proscriptive than prescriptive. What the Court should not do 
is accept a simplistic characterization of the New York City rule as a ban and use 
that characterization as the basis for per se invalidation. If the Justices are drawn 
to a more rule-like Second Amendment jurisprudence—and there is reason to 
believe that they are, despite its difficulties—then the foundations must be laid 
with due care. 
This Article has attempted to show the signiﬁcance of characterizing a law as 
a ban, and to provide a framework for characterization going forward. Fore-
grounding these issues is important because the concept of bans does important 
work throughout constitutional rights law, but often without due attention to 
the questions of how to characterize a regulation as a ban and why this label 
matters. Nonetheless, the free-speech and takings doctrines provide some illu-
minating lessons with regard to the deﬁnitional and normative questions. 
Those lessons, and a careful consideration of the structure of constitutional 
rights adjudication in general, suggest three possible approaches to evaluating 
bans: functionalism, formalism, and purposivism. Each has a role to play, 
though in the run of cases functionalism will generally be the most useful, trans-
parent, and consistent method of effectuating constitutional rights without dis-
torting the relevant interest or the role of the judiciary. 
